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There have been numerous responses to shaykh Rabee' al-Madkhali, may Allah guide him. However, most of these responses contain some deficiencies:
Generally, those who have identified one of his clear errors have not properly responded to them nor explained their negative effects. The best of these responses is the book "Defense of the Followers" by Abu'l-Hasan al-Ma'ribi, although he missed one of al-Madkhali's false principles and did not find a response to one of them. Moreover, he didn't cover the extensive and intricate details, causing the focus to be lost amidst the volume of content.
In his book "Warning Everyone of Shaykh Rabee's Mistakes and His Atrocious Methods," he tried to correct much of this. I have attempted, with Allah's help, to compensate for these shortcomings, benefiting from many responses, resulting in this summary.
This summary serves as an introduction to a detailed response that will include verbatim quotes from shaykh Rabee', along with numerous quotations from scholars that refute his principles and fundamentals. May Allah facilitate its completion and publication. I chose not to include his complete statements in this summary, except rarely, and instead depicted his words and principles in a way that approximates his wording to avoid confusing the reader due to their scattered nature. Instead of quoting his refuted statements, I have compiled them in an appendix at the end of the response for those who wish to verify and examine them.
Shaykh Rabee' al-Madkhali has four false principles that we will explain with Allah's help. Some of these principles encompass several issues, summarized as follows:
Between the third and fourth principles, I included a section explaining his errors in the details of the issue of faith. Here is the intended explanation:
The First Principle: Innovation in methodology is equivalent to innovation in Creed according to him. He asserted that the Khawaarij were Salafis in creed because they did not associate partners with Allah in worship nor did they deny the names and attributes of Allah. Their deviation, according to him, was in methodology due to their misguidance in governance. This is based on his distinction between methodology and creed, a distinction he was forced to make because of the trials where the people of innovation would deceive Ahlus-Sunnah by claiming to be Salafis in creed while following the Ikhwani or Tableeghi methodologies.
According to him, the Khawaarij are Salafis in creed but innovators in methodology. By this, he means that any Salafi from the Muslim Brotherhood or the Tableeghi Jamaa'ah is an innovator outside the fold of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah, and their Salafiyyah in creed does not benefit them, just as it did not benefit the Khawaarij before, because these groups are innovators in methodology, just as the Khawaarij were innovators in methodology before.
Since shaykh ibn Baaz (may Allah have mercy on him) did not distinguish between methodology and creed, unlike shaykh al-Albaani (may Allah have mercy on him) according to what shaykh Rabee' reported about them, he could not declare those Salafis as innovators unless he differentiated between methodology and creed. Thus, Rabee' "had" to say that there is a distinction between them, as a prelude to his statement: Salafis in creed, innovators in methodology, so that he could categorize a person who is Salafi in creed but follows the methodology of the Brotherhood or the Tableeghi Jamaa'at with the Khawaarij in the same category. According to him, they are all innovators and not from Ahlus-Sunnah, not because they deviate in any principle of belief but because they are innovators in methodology.
Since the premise of differentiating between methodology and creed was essential for him, he "had" to say it. This implies that before that, he was either not saying there was a distinction or he was undecided on the matter. He then began to claim the distinction, not due to new evidence that emerged on the issue, but out of necessity, to stop the fitnah (tribulation) caused by these groups. This means he believed before he sought evidence, and when he sought evidence to support his differentiation between methodology and creed and to ward off the fitnah, he introduced this unprecedented statement: that the Khawaarij are Salafis in creed but innovators in methodology, a statement no scholar before him had made. Allah's help is sought.
What shaykh Rabee' said indicates a deep error in his methods of derivation and his foundational reasoning in such matters. He chooses a stance not because of the strength of its evidence but because it is the most suitable for denouncing those he sees as deviating from the Sunni methodology. This is similar to shaykh al-Qaradawi's approach (may Allah forgive him) in choosing the authority of the Sahaabi's opinion, maslaha mursalah (unrestricted public interest), and istihsaan (juridical preference), not for any reason except that it serves the desired facilitation in jurisprudence. You will see the impact of this approach on shaykh Rabee', may Allah guide him, in all his principles.
What shaykh Rabee', may Allah guide him, stated in this principle—considering the innovation of the Khawaarij to be absolutely in methodology without distinction—contradicts the consensus of the Salaf. The Salaf agree that considering major sins less than shirk (polytheism) as disbelief and denying intercession for Muslim sinners are innovations in creed. The deviation of the Khawaarij in methodology, as mentioned by al-Madkhali, is only a branch of this corrupt principle. Almost no treatise on creed fails to include a refutation of the Khawaarij, and this is what al-Madkhali overlooked. Otherwise, how could he claim that the Khawaarij were Salafis in creed? This falsehood is so apparent that even a beginner student can recognize it, so how could someone who is described as the bearer of the banner of al-Jarh wat-Ta'deel (criticism and commendation of hadith narrators) not see it?
Regarding the distinction between methodology and creed, there is no doubt that there is a general difference between them, as indicated by the Ayah [interpretation of the meaning]: "To each of you We prescribed a law and a method." (Al-Maa'idah 5:48), and the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah upon him): "The Prophets are paternal brothers; their mothers are different, but their religion is one" (agreed upon). It is clear that the calls of the Prophets agreed on the foundational issues of belief, which are faith in Allah and His worship alone without partners, faith in prophethood and messengership, and faith in the Last Day, Paradise, and Hell. These three foundational principles have abundant rational evidence in the Book of Allah, as mentioned by shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him). They are the greatest issues of belief and are not among the differing methodologies of the Prophets. The methodology is the Sunnah and the way, as ibn 'Abbaas said in his tafseer of the Ayah: "A path and a way" (Quran 5:48). Imam ibn Rajab (may Allah have mercy on him) said in Fath al-Baaree (1/19): "Ibn 'Abbaas meant that the methodology is the Sunnah, which is the wide, trodden path adhered to, and the law is the way that leads to it, like an entrance to it."
Al-'Allaamah ibnul-Qayyim (may Allah have mercy on him) said in Shifaa' al-'Aleel: "The objective is not achieved except by guidance to the path and guidance within it. A person may be guided to the path of his goal but not guided in the details of his journey within it, its timings, and its provisions. This is why ibn 'Abbaas said about the Ayah [translation of the meaning]: 'For each [community] We have made a law and a method' (Quran 5:48): A path and a Sunnah. This tafseer needs explanation. The path is the methodology, and the Sunnah is the law, which includes the details of the path, its difficulties, and how to travel within it and its timings. Thus, the path is the methodology, and the law is the Sunnah."
Thus, methodology refers to general rules and principles. If we consider what is meant by this term in our time, specifically the methodology of change and dealing with opponents—which is the meaning al-Madkhali refers to in his previous statement about the Khawaarij—we find that its issues are:
And among these branches, some differences are significant while others are not. How then can all these errors be considered equal and on the same level? This means that the relationship between the methodology of change and dealing with opponents and creed is general and specific. As is well known, practical innovation is not like doctrinal innovation. Regarding practical innovation, an additional innovation is not like an original innovation. And in doctrinal innovation, innovation in a minor part of the fundamentals of belief is not like innovation in the core of belief itself, as established by scholars. Yet, al-Madkhali views innovation in methodology as equivalent to innovation in the fundamentals of belief without distinction. This equates to considering the innovation in methodology at the same level as the Khawaarij's innovation, without differentiating the matter. His statement is similar to the Khawaarij who equated major disbelief with lesser major sins, treating both as the same.
It is known that Rabee' does not permit saying that the Companions differed in belief without distinguishing between the fundamentals and branches of belief. It is evident that the Salaf, after the Companions, differed on several issues related to the branches of belief, not its fundamentals, and they were allowed this, as mentioned by shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him). There are numerous examples, not limited to the issue of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) seeing his Lord. If there had not been minor disagreements among the Companions that were accommodated, it would not have been possible to accommodate differences in other issues of the branches of belief among the Taabi'oon and their followers. Therefore, you will not find one of them declaring someone an innovator for differing on such issues.
The notion that someone could claim to be Salafi in creed but Ikhwani or Tableeghi in methodology is undoubtedly a deviation. It is akin to someone saying they are Shaafi'ee in jurisprudence, Ash'ari in creed, and Qaadiri in Sufism. This is because there are contradictions in the positions of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tableeghi Jamaa'ah on issues of the fundamentals of belief. Moreover, the methodology of Ahlus-Sunnah in change and dealing with opponents is sufficient and comprehensive. As shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "No one deviates from the Shari'ah methods to innovative methods except out of ignorance, inability, or corrupt intentions" (Majmoo' al-Fatawa, vol. 11, p. 620). He illustrated corrupt intentions with love of leadership and unjustly taking people's money. However, this deviation is not at the same level for everyone and varies according to how much one agrees with the Ikhwan or Tableegh and the extent of this deviation in the religion of Allah.
If this deviation is in the fundamentals of belief, then it is evaluated based on the extent of these minor points. If they collectively reach the level of a fundamental principle, then it is judged as deviating from Ahlus-Sunnah in a fundamental belief. Imam ash-Shaatibi (may Allah have mercy on him) pointed this out in al-I'tisaam, saying: "Innovations are of two types: general and specific. General innovations pervade many branches of Shari'ah, like the innovations of the seventy-three sects, which are in general principles, not specific ones." He also said: "These sects become sects by differing from the saved group in a general principle in religion or a foundational rule of Shari'ah, not in a specific matter. The specific or rare branch does not cause division into sects, but division occurs when there is disagreement in general principles."
Those outside the sects who innovate in specific matters do not reach the level of the general innovators in criticism and explicit threat of hellfire, but they share in the meaning that warrants criticism and threat. He also mentioned: "Those who follow certain leaders in the fundamentals of religion and speech vary. Some have greatly opposed the Sunnah in significant fundamentals, while others have only opposed it in minor details. Such people, if they do not make their innovation a cause to separate from the Muslim community, to ally with their followers and oppose their dissenters, and if they do not permit fighting those who differ with them, then their error is forgivable by Allah. Many of the Salaf and imams of the Ummah fell into such errors by ijtihaad, which contradicts the established texts. However, those who ally with their supporters and oppose their dissenters, separating the Muslim community and deeming their opponents disbelievers or sinners, and permit fighting them, are among the people of division and discord." (Majmoo' al-Fatawa, vol. 3, pp. 348-349).
Furthermore, most of these Salafis with Ikhwani or Tableeghi methodology are unaware of the contradictions found in the works of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tableeghi Jamaa'ah against Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah in the fundamentals of belief. Their knowledge of the creed of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah from the Salaf imams is general, not detailed. They are also ignorant of the methods of scholars in judging sects, which shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah summarized in Minhaaj as-Sunnah: "A sect is distinguished by the name of its leaders or by the description of its conditions. The former is like saying the Najdat, the Azaariqah, the Jahmiyyah, the Najjaariyyah, the Darraariyyah, and so on. The latter is like saying the Raafidhah, the Shi'ah, the Qadariyyah, the Murji'ah, the Khawaarij, and so on."
From what has been mentioned, it becomes clear that passing judgment on someone regarding their methodology of change and dealing with opponents should not be done in an absolute and general manner, as Rabee' has done. This would equate different levels of mistakes, which is incorrect. Instead, a detailed assessment is necessary, specifying the level of the error and then judging the individual accordingly. This aligns with what al-'Allaamah ibnul-Qayyim (may Allah have mercy on him) said in his Nooniyyah:
So, you must be detailed and discerning, for general and unrestricted statements without clarification have corrupted this world and misled minds and opinions in every era.
As for Rabee's statement that it is not permissible to distinguish between creed and methodology, it is possible that this is his old stance. It could also mean he disapproves of someone whose creed is Salafi but whose methodology is Ikhwani or Tableeghi, due to this differentiation. This latter interpretation seems more likely.
Among his errors also is his general statement that anyone who has the ideas of the Khawaarij is called a Khaariji without differentiating between those who agree with the Khawaarij on the fundamentals of their belief and those who agree with them on the branches of their belief without their fundamentals. This is what adh-Dhahabi (may Allah have mercy on him) described in "Siyar A'laam an-Nubalaa'"—in the biography of Abu'l-Qaasim Abdur-Rahman ibn Mandah—that he was among Ahlus-Sunnah but had some Khaariji tendencies. Ibn Abi'l-'Izz (may Allah have mercy on him) described this in his commentary on at-Tahaawiyyah, p. 320, noting that a person may be a scholar from Ahlus-Sunnah yet hold some views of the people of desires, which are branches of those innovations, not the entirety of the innovation. He mentioned the Khawaarij among them. Shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah said: "Many of those who affiliate themselves with the Sunnah have innovations akin to those of the Raafidhah and Khawaarij." This statement is similar to the Prophet's (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) saying: "You are a person in whom there is Jaahiliyyah," and his saying: "Whoever has any characteristic of them has a characteristic of hypocrisy." Imam Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "Expelling people from the Sunnah is severe," narrated by al-Khallal in as-Sunnah, no. 513.
The negligence of some people falls under what ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) mentioned in Majmoo' al-Fatawa, vol. 12, pp. 466-467: "In opposition to those who declare takfeer falsely, there are people who do not know the belief of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah as it should be, or they know part of it and are ignorant of part. What they know of it, they do not explain to people but rather conceal it, and they do not forbid the innovations contrary to the Qur'an, Sunnah, and consensus, nor do they criticize or punish the people of innovation. Instead, they may criticize speaking about the Sunnah and fundamentals of religion absolutely, without distinguishing between what is indicated by the Qur'an, Sunnah, and consensus, and what is said by the people of innovation and division. Or they approve of everyone’s differing opinions as scholars approve in matters of ijtihaad where dispute is permissible. This method is prevalent among many of the Murji'ah, some jurists, Sufis, and philosophers, just as the first method prevails among many of the people of desires and kalam. Both of these methods are outside the bounds of the Qur'an and Sunnah."
Such individuals' negligence should not be countered with excessiveness.
Among shaykh Rabee's mistakes is his prohibition of using the term "Tawheed al-Haakimiyyah" (Monotheism of Governance), arguing that none of the scholars mentioned any division other than the three categories of Tawheed, making it an innovative statement. This error has been made by many contemporary scholars. The answer to this is that Tawheed al-Haakimiyyah falls under Tawheed al-Uloohiyyah (Monotheism of Worship), as Allah commanded us to adhere to the Book and the Sunnah and to judge by His law in all matters of religion, including creed, jurisprudence, and politics. It also falls under Tawheed ar-Ruboobiyyah (Monotheism of Lordship), as Allah has no partner in judgment, command, making lawful and unlawful, and legislation. Furthermore, it is included in Tawheed al-Asmaa' was-Sifaat (Monotheism of the Names and Attributes), as Allah is the Judge, the Sovereign, and the Master of people. It is also part of Tawheed al-Ittibaa' (Monotheism of Following the Messenger), as Allah says: "But no, by your Lord, they will not [truly] believe until they make you [O Muhammad] judge concerning that over which they dispute among themselves" (Quran 4:65). This is acknowledged by those who deny mentioning Tawheed al-Haakimiyyah as a separate category.
Since this is the case, there is no issue in mentioning it specifically, as some scholars have done, including al-'Allaamah ibnul-Qayyim (may Allah have mercy on him) contrary to what the opponents believe. In the second volume of his book "Madaarij as-Saalikeen," when discussing "the station of contentment," after mentioning the Ayah [interpretation of the meaning]: "Say, 'Shall I seek a lord other than Allah while He is the Lord of all things?'" (Al-An'aam 6:164), "Say, 'Is it other than Allah I should take as a protector, Creator of the heavens and the earth?'" (Al-An'aam 6:14), and "[Say], 'Then is it other than Allāh I should seek as judge while it is He who has revealed to you the Book [i.e., the Qur’ān] explained in detail?'" (Al-An'aam 6:114)—all three verses being in Surah al-An'aam—he said (may Allah have mercy on him): "These three stations are the pillars of Tawheed: not taking anyone other than Him as a Lord, a God, or a Judge."
The error of some in using this term with a corrupt or deficient meaning, or for a false purpose, or neglecting other issues of Tawheed, does not justify denying this term. Especially with the widespread acceptance of the "Taghoot of Democracy," which grants the right of legislation to the people, allowing them to make laws and consider it a right. The people are to elect representatives for legislation in parliamentary councils, which are thus described as legislative representatives, and they have the choice of which laws to follow, equating Islamic Shari'ah with man-made laws in principle. The implementation of Shari'ah is not mandatory and can be left out in a democratic system where sovereignty belongs to the people. Therefore, they say the parliament is the legislative authority with no higher authority. This is the reality of democracy according to its legal definition, as noted by legal scholars and in the explanatory notes of constitutional documents. Any discussion of democracy that ignores this reality is baseless and like plowing water, tailoring a garment contrary to its owner's intent, and it will not align with Shari'ah because judgment on something is a branch of understanding it.
Understanding something involves returning to its reality, and there are three types of realities: legal, linguistic, and customary. Customary reality can be general or specific, and the reality of democracy and its mechanisms must be understood by its specific customary meaning. Ignoring this fundamental principle will undoubtedly lead to error. This comes alongside the fascination of some Muslims with democracy, adopting its principles as mutakallimeen did with philosophy, using its tools to defend religion and Shari'ah. This is exactly what the mutakallimeen did when they rejected the atheistic doctrines of philosophers but adopted their argumentative methods to defend Islam and the Sunnah, which imam Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) warned against by saying: "Do not sit with the people of kalaam, even if they defend the Sunnah."
This has led some contemporary Muslims to adopt a discourse on democracy similar to the kalaam that imam Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) described, saying: "They speak with ambiguous speech, confusing the ignorant with what they speak of ambiguity." Their discourse includes general terms that can mean both truth and falsehood or combine both. This has reached the extent that their discourse has become secular, just as some mutakallimeen became philosophers, and Allah's help is sought.
Among shaykh Rabee's mistakes is his condemnation and labeling of those he sees as deviating from the Salafi methodology as "partisans" (ḥizbiyyūn), asserting that partisanship does not require organization. It would have been better for him to adhere to the judgments of the Salaf regarding those who differed from their creed, labeling them as people of innovation, desires, and division. Partisanship in the Book of Allah is not condemned universally except when it appears in the plural form, as in the term "parties" (aḥzāb). In contrast, in the singular form, Allah has praised the "party of Allah" and mentioned their commendable attributes. Using the terms "partisanship" and "partisans" indiscriminately could include these praised individuals in its denotation, even if the speaker does not intend it. It could also encompass what shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) permitted in Majmoo' al-Fatawa, vol. 11, p. 92, and Majmoo'at ar-Rasaa'il wal-Masaa'il, vol. 1, p. 161, where he said:
"Whoever takes responsibility for a group, it is said he is their leader. If he has taken responsibility for something good, he is praised for it; if for something evil, he is condemned for it. As for the head of a party, it is the head of a group that forms a party. If they gather upon what Allah and His Messenger have commanded without addition or subtraction, they are believers who have what they have and upon whom is what is upon them. If they have added or subtracted, such as being biased towards those in their party whether right or wrong, and turning away from those not in their party whether right or wrong, this is the division condemned by Allah and His Messenger. For Allah and His Messenger commanded unity and alliance and forbade division and discord, and commanded cooperation in righteousness and piety and forbade cooperation in sin and transgression."
Among the forms of condemned bias that ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) stipulated must be absent is what he stated in Majmoo' al-Fatawa, vol. 3, pp. 342-343:
"Attaching matters of love and hatred, loyalty and enmity, support and abandonment, agreement and disagreement, approval and anger, giving and withholding, to anything that contradicts these foundational principles revealed by Allah, whether more specific or more general, or both more general and more specific in some respects... The specifically general: affiliation with a particular type of some religious practices such as affiliation with warriors, scholars, or Sufis, or affiliation with some factions within these groups such as a specific imam, shaykh, king, or a head of the speakers or a certain statement or action distinguished by a group, or the banner of these groups from clothing, turbans, or otherwise, such as some people being biased towards a specific garment or covering, implying the general garment for scholars and the poor, or specific to one of these, or some factions within these, or clothing for warriors, or similar. All of these are from the matters of ignorance that divide the nation. Its people are outside the Sunnah and the community, partaking in innovation and division. The religion of Allah is that His Messenger, Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), should be the one whose command and prohibition is followed, who is followed in his love and enmity, his approval and anger, his giving and withholding, his loyalty and enmity, his support and abandonment."
This generality in the terms "partisanship" and "partisans" might lead some to think that shaykh Rabee' views organizing collective work, such as charitable and advocacy associations, as an innovation. This is a mistake attributed to Sheikh Rabee', which he has denied in several instances, allowing it in Muslim countries governed by secular systems and man-made laws, which is contrary to what shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah stated. This is similar to criticizing the Mu'tazilah and modernists by calling them "rationalists," even though they are extremists in their rationalism. Scholars are the true people of sound reasoning, as al-Ajurri (may Allah have mercy on him) described them in "ash-Shari'ah," calling them "the people of knowledge and reason." They are more deserving of being described as "those endowed with understanding" whom Allah praised at the end of Surah Aali-Imran. The term "rationalists" as a criticism implies rejecting rational evidence altogether, which is not the intent of the speaker.
The Shari'ah evidence is both auditory and rational. Criticizing opponents with the term "rationalists" might mislead others into thinking Ahlus-Sunnah reject rational evidence entirely. This misconception affected some people in the past due to what they saw from the Mu'tazilah, leading them to deny the existence of rational evidence in Allah's religion. As shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) mentioned in "Dar' Ta'arud al-'Aql wa al-Naql," the correct judgment on these people is what the Salaf called them: the people of desires.
The same can be said about criticizing with the term "takfiris" due to its generality. It does not solely refer to extremism in declaring others as disbelievers or engaging in it without knowledge. It also includes declaring disbelief in accordance with the judgment of Allah and His Messenger, which is praiseworthy. Not all declarations of disbelief are blameworthy, and not every warning against it is praiseworthy. Imam Abdur-Rahman ibn Hasan ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab (may Allah have mercy on him) said in "ad-Durar as-Saniyyah," vol. 11, p. 446: "We received papers from a wicked man warning against takfeer without investigation or clarity." The warning should be against extremism in takfeer, not against takfeer in unrestricted terms. Regarding takfeer, people's attitudes are as imam ibn Abi'l-'Izz (may Allah have mercy on him) said in his commentary on "at-Tahaawiyyah," p. 316: "They are either on one extreme, another extreme, or in the middle."
Criticizing with the terms "takfiris" and "rationalists" is a widespread error, and among those who fell into this mistake is al-Madkhali. Allah's help is sought. This aligns with ibnul-Qayyim's (may Allah have mercy on him) statement in his "Nooniyyah" criticizing general statements where details are necessary, which was previously mentioned.
The Second Principle: The innovator's good deeds should never be mentioned, without distinguishing between contexts of warning, evaluation, and biographies. This principle is considered fundamental by Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah. Shaykh Rabee' argues that it is impossible to distinguish between the Sunnah and innovation, or between authentic and weak hadiths, or to defend Islam and the Sunnah without this principle. He refers to opposing this view as the "methodology of balancing," considering it the most deceitful plot against Islam. He claims that if this principle were adopted, it would lead to the destruction of the Quran, the Sunnah, sciences of Shari'ah, and even all human sciences?! He asserts that it contradicts the Quran, the Sunnah, and the consensus of the Ummah, and that it is an innovation in methodology. Moreover, he considers those who oppose this principle to be partisans.
And shaykh Rabee' al-Madkhali, may Allah guide him, countered this principle with another innovative statement, claiming that his principle is one of the fundamentals of Ahlus-Sunnah and their methodology. This is something the Salaf warned against, as they rejected the innovation of the obligation to balance between good and bad deeds when warning about innovators. He replaced this with another extreme, prohibiting the balance between good and bad deeds not only in the context of warning (which is correct) but also in the context of evaluation and biography. The truth lies in the middle between these two extremes, distinguishing between the two contexts: warning, where mentioning good deeds is inappropriate as it undermines the intent to dissuade from innovation and its proponents; and evaluation and biography, where fairness and justice require mentioning both the merits and faults.
Shaykh 'Abdur-Rahman as-Sa'di said in his commentary on the eighth Ayah of Surah al-Maa'idah (5:8) [interpretation of the meaning]: "(and do not let the hatred of a people prevent you from being just) meaning that their enmity should not lead you to injustice, as those who lack justice and fairness do. Rather, as you testify for your ally, testify against him as well. And as you testify against your enemy, testify for him as well. Even if he is a disbeliever or an innovator, justice towards him is obligatory, and accepting the truth he brings forth is required, not because he said it, but because it is the truth."
The inclusion of the innovator in this Ayah is inferred through the principle of a fortiori (qiyaas al-awlaa), as mentioned by ibn Taymiyyah in "al-Istiqaamah," vol. 1, p. 38. Accepting the truth from an innovator and mentioning the correctness of his statements and actions in historical accounts indeed involves mentioning his good deeds. Shaykh al-Madkhali's stance necessitates preventing this, something no scholar has advocated, as far as I know. It is an innovative claim. Otherwise, how does al-Madkhali justify adh-Dhahabi's leniency in "Siyar A'laam an-Nubalaa'" by saying that as a historian, he might sometimes be lenient?
The praise of the Salaf for Khaalid al-Qasri, a Naasibi, for his execution of Ja'd ibn Dirham when he was the governor of Iraq is well known. This story was mentioned by the Salaf scholars like al-Bukhaari in "Khalq Af'aal al-'Ibaad," 'Uthmaan ad-Daarimi in "ar-Radd 'ala al-Jahmiyyah," and al-Laalikaa'i in "Sharh Usool I'tiqaad Ahl as-Sunnah." Al-'Allaamah ibnul-Qayyim (may Allah have mercy on him) even said in his Nooniyyah: "Every follower of the Sunnah is grateful to the sacrifice of the offering," yet according to al-Madkhali's principle, this should be condemned and erased because the one who did it was a Naasibi who used to criticize the Rightly Guided Caliph 'Ali (may Allah be pleased with him).
It should be noted that this explanation is not a defense of innovation or its people, nor a promotion of such, as al-Madkhali might imagine. There is no contradiction between this and the necessity to warn against innovations and innovators, even by naming them. This obligation is agreed upon, as mentioned by ibn Taymiyyah in Majmoo' al-Fatawa, vol. 28, pp. 231-232. Rather, the issue is as shaykh Muhibb ad-Deen al-Khateeb said in his introduction to "al-'Awaasim min al-Qawaasim" by ibn al-'Arabi al-Maaliki: "One must, when speaking about the people of truth and goodness, if they have slips, not forget the prevailing truth and goodness over them, so as not to invalidate all that because of those slips. And one must, when speaking about the people of falsehood and evil, if they have done some good deeds, not mislead people into thinking they are righteous because of those rare good deeds."
When al-Madkhali was presented with statements from adh-Dhahabi in "Siyar A'laam an-Nubalaa'" that contradicted his principle, he sometimes responded by describing adh-Dhahabi as lenient with the people of innovation. At other times, he speculated that these statements might have been inserted into adh-Dhahabi's works by the Sufis. On other occasions, he suggested that if adh-Dhahabi had known that people of desires would exploit his words, he would not have said them. Look at this inconsistency. Perhaps his latest statement is the final thought process of al-Madkhali, and it will be repeated similarly with ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) in the third principle.
When ibn Taymiyyah's words were cited against his principle, he mentioned what ibn Taymiyyah said about himself and what one of his students mentioned about him—that the people of innovation lied about him during his lifetime and inserted things into his books. This is in addition to the fact that such a claim is similar to the argument of the mutakallimeen regarding ahaadeeth al-Aahaad, rejecting them on the basis that they are speculative and that the narrator could make a mistake. This is a claim that anyone who does not like the words of ibn Taymiyyah or adh-Dhahabi or others can make, just as the people of innovation do with the hadith of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). The occurrence of lies against ibn Taymiyyah and adh-Dhahabi or errors in attributing letters to them does not invalidate the rest of their meticulously preserved books, just as the presence of mistakes, errors, and lies about the hadith of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) is not a reason to reject his authentic preserved hadiths, even if they are Aahaad. Such rejection is a slander against the Sunnah and the scholars and reviewers of hadith.
What al-Madkhali uttered, if not a criticism of their well-preserved books whose originals have been safeguarded by the scholars, is similar to the criticism of the people of innovation against the Sunnah. So, what else could it be?
It is astonishing that he tried to patch up his statement in his book "Bayān Fasād al-Mi'yār: Ḥiwār ma'a Ḥizbī Mutasattir" by arguing that he was refuting errors that contradict their methodology. This is, as they say, an excuse worse than the offense. If the discussion were about a single instance in their books, it might have some basis, but there are many such instances in both authors' works, especially in "Siyar A'laam an-Nubalaa'" by adh-Dhahabi. Otherwise, how can he accuse adh-Dhahabi of leniency and claim that if adh-Dhahabi had known the consequences of his words, he would not have said them? If his excuse were valid, it would validate the arguments of the people of innovation who reject hadith on the basis that they contradict reason, claiming that religion would not endorse such things, when in fact, the reality is that these hadiths contradict their desires.
Al-Madkhali claims that senior contemporary scholars like ibn Baaz and al-Fawzan agree with him on this principle, distorting their words and misapplying them. Their statements were responses to questions posed by Rabee's followers and were specifically about warning against innovators. Al-Madkhali generalized what was specific in their responses, despite some of their statements indicating a distinction between the contexts of warning and evaluation.
When shaykh ibn Baaz, al-'Uthaymeen, al-Albaani, Saalih Aal ash-Shaykh, and other scholars were mentioned, they explicitly differentiated between the two contexts. Shaykh ibn Baaz (may Allah have mercy on him) attributed this approach to shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah in his message "Important Clarifications on What as-Saabooni Wrote About the Attributes of Allah the Almighty," where he said in the context of explaining the principle mentioned by ibn Taymiyyah: "The Ash'aris and others are praised for what they said and wrote in support of the truth in the fundamentals of religion and other matters, and they are criticized for their mistakes in order to uphold the truth and refute falsehood so that the matter is not confused for those with limited knowledge."
However, shaykh Rabee' had a different opinion. When commenting on the book "Ibn Taymiyyah's Position on the Ash'aris" by Abdur-Rahman ibn Mahmoud, he argued that this had nothing to do with the methodology of balancing and that ibn Taymiyyah intended to distinguish between truth and falsehood, guidance and misguidance, so that the truth could be known and taken and the falsehood recognized and avoided. This is astonishing, and one wonders whether to laugh or cry at this statement. Isn't mentioning the truth they hold and highlighting what they got right a form of acknowledging their good deeds? And is mentioning their good deeds anything other than acknowledging their correct beliefs, statements, and actions?
Shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah was accurate in describing beliefs of innovation as something that cannot be fully understood. Where is this supposed interpretation in what ibn Taymiyyah mentioned in "Dar' Ta'arud al-Aql wa an-Naql," vol. 1, pp. 99-103, about the good qualities of al-Baaqillaani and Abu Dharr al-Harawi? Or what he mentioned in "Al-Furqaan bayna Awliyaa' ar-Rahman wa Awliyaa' ash-Shaytan," vol. 13, p. 96, of Majmoo' al-Fatawa about the conversion of disbelievers at the hands of the Raafidhah and Jahmiyyah? Or his statement in "al-Fatawa al-Kubra," vol. 6, p. 262, after discussing Abu'l-Hasan al-Ash'ari: "The correct view of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah is that a person or a group may have both commendable good deeds and blameworthy bad deeds, and they may deserve reward for their good deeds and punishment for their bad deeds. They are neither to be praised nor condemned for permissible and forgiven errors of forgetfulness. This is the view of Ahlus-Sunnah concerning the sinful believers and others. Therefore, many in the Ummah, including the leading scholars and rulers, have both aspects, and some people focus only on their good deeds out of excessive love, while others focus only on their bad deeds out of excessive hatred. The religion of Allah is between the one who goes to extremes and the one who falls short, and the best matters are in the middle."
These quotes refute your claim. No wonder shaykh al-'Uthaymeen (may Allah have mercy on him) was astonished by what al-Madkhali asserted. Allah's help is sought.
When Rabee' al-Madkhali discussed the narrators of hadith who were innovators, he applied his principle to them, stating that mentioning the narrator's honesty and reliability in transmitting hadith serves the interest of preserving the Sunnah. He claimed that books of biographies do not contain any mention of good deeds, using the books of criticism and commendation and the statements of the scholars of this field as evidence. If only he had restricted this to innovative narrators, but he extended it to include all discredited narrators, even if they were not innovators. In his book "al-Muhajjah al-Baydaa' fee Himaayat as-Sunnah al-Gharraa'," he claimed that this also applies to all discredited narrators and that if mentioning good deeds were obligatory or recommended, it would imply that the books of criticism and commendation are guilty of the greatest and ugliest injustice!
Among the evidence cited by al-Madkhali is a statement from imam Muslim in the introduction to his Saheeh, where he lists biographies of severely weak narrators. His bias led him to omit five statements from three of the leading scholars of Jarh wa Ta'deel (criticism and commendation): Ayyoob as-Sakhtiyani, Abu az-Zinad, and ibn al-Mubaarak. These can be found in the introduction to Saheeh Muslim with the commentary of an-Nawawi, vol. 1, pp. 86, 94, 97, 104, and 117. The only reason for their omission is that four of these statements contradict his claim, as they contain unqualified praise for virtue, religion, or trustworthiness, not just honesty. What al-Madkhali did is characteristic of the people of innovation, not Ahlus-Sunnah. Imam Wakee' ibn al-Jarraah (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "Ahlus-Sunnah narrate what is for them and against them, while the people of innovation do not narrate except what is for them."
We seek refuge in Allah from following whims and distorting the truth. How can someone with this tendency have any status in the science of hadith? There is no excuse for this omission under the pretext that it was a mistake, as al-Madkhali himself claimed in another instance. These statements were scattered, not consecutive. Additionally, there are statements from four other scholars of Jarh wa Ta'deel regarding narrators who were either innovators or had issues with their precision, refuting al-Madkhali's claim. One such statement, omitted from the introduction to Saheeh Muslim, is from imam ibn al-Mubaarak (may Allah have mercy on him): "I said to Sufyan ath-Thawri: 'Abbaad ibn Katheer is known for his condition, and when he speaks, he brings forth something significant. Do you think I should tell people not to take from him?' Sufyan replied: 'Yes.' So, whenever I was in a gathering where 'Abbaad was mentioned, I praised his piety and advised people not to take from him."
Imam Sufyan ibn 'Uyaynah (may Allah have mercy on him) said about 'Abdullah ibn Abi Labeed: "He was one of the devout worshippers of Madinah, but he held the belief in al-Qadar." This was reported by al-Humaydi in his Musnad and by al-Bukhaari in at-Taareekh al-Kabeer.
Imam Abu Zur'ah ar-Raazi (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "I was with Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and Ibraaheem ibn Tahmaan was mentioned. Ahmad, who was lying down due to illness, sat up and said: 'The righteous should not be mentioned while reclining.'" Imam Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) said about Ibraaheem ibn Tahmaan: "He was a Murji' but very strict against the Jahmiyyah," as mentioned by adh-Dhahabi in Siyar A'laam an-Nubalaa'.
Imam ibn Hibbaan, in his book "ath-Thiqaat," said about al-Hasan ibn Saalih ibn Hayy: "He was a jurist, devout, austere, dedicated to worship, and renounced leadership despite his Shi'ite inclinations." He also said about Talaq ibn Habeeb: "He was a devout worshipper Murji'."
Where, then, is this alleged consensus?
Similarly, al-Madkhali cited statements from al-Albaani in his book "The Methodology of the People of the Sunnah in Criticizing Men, Books, and Sects" and again in his book "The Corruption of the Standard: Dialogue with a Hidden Partisan," where al-Albaani is described as the flag bearer of Jarh wa Ta'deel (criticism and commendation) in this era. This, from shaykh al-Albaani (may Allah have mercy on him) is an exaggeration and an elevation of al-Madkhali above his rightful place, which is not accepted by shaykh Hamood ibn 'Uqlaa' ash-Shu'aybi (may Allah have mercy on him) nor by shaykh al-Fawzan and others. We do not deny that al-Madkhali has played a part in exposing the errors of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tableeghi Jamaa'ah, revealing their deviations to a wide audience, not only among students but even among scholars.
This, however, contradicts what he himself has stated regarding the innovator narrator, as shaykh al-Albaani explicitly mentioned the necessity of noting the good qualities of an innovator narrator in biographies, such as their asceticism, worship, and jihad, unlike warnings where these are not mentioned. Al-Madkhali did not respond to this at all. The best refutation of his principle regarding innovators in general and narrator innovators specifically in terms of evaluation and biography is found in the second edition of Ahmad as-Suwayan's book "The Methodology of the People of the Sunnah and the Community in Evaluating Men and Their Works."
Al-Madkhali also contradicted himself by violating this principle when speaking about the Khawaarij, describing them as Salafi in creed, as mentioned in the first principle. This is a mention of their good qualities, whether he likes it or not.
As for naming this objectionable approach "the method of balancing" without providing detail, this terminology would be something even ibn Taymiyyah would have understood, for he said in "Majmoo' al-Fatawa," vol. 10, p. 366: "This is the way of balancing and equalizing." However, the term has been generalized, as had happened before with terms like "literalist" and "intercession," for example. It requires detail and clarification, accepting the truth indicated by the original term and rejecting the falsehood that has attached itself to it in the minds of many users. This was explained by shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) in his book "Intercession and Means" and other books and letters. It is not to reject the terms wholesale, but rather to clarify their meanings and differentiate between correct and incorrect usage, similar to the term "balancing."
Al-Madkhali has discussed this principle more than any other, writing two books to establish this issue: "The Methodology of the People of the Sunnah in Criticizing Men, Books, and Sects" and "The Clear Argument in Defense of the Glorious Sunnah." He also addressed it in two other books: "The Noble Victory in the Concise Refutation: Dialogue with 'Abdur-Rahman 'Abdul-Khaaliq" and "The Corruption of the Standard: Dialogue with a Hidden Partisan." This principle of his limits one of the foundational principles of Ahlus-Sunnah in the field of faith to the evil of innovation without considering the evil of immorality. It concerns the possibility of the coexistence of good and bad deeds in one person, including both Sunnah and innovation. According to this principle, a person, including an innovator, is to be loved to the extent of their good deeds and hated to the extent of their bad deeds, as shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) stated. This is not only implied by al-Madkhali's statement but also explicitly claimed by him, as he argued that distinguishing between love and hate is a burden the heart cannot bear and is an impossible task. He further claimed that this was a mistaken judgment from ibn Taymiyyah, refuted by the consensus of the Salaf on hating and shunning the people of innovation.
This confusion leads to the assertion that a blatant sinner must be loved unconditionally and cannot be hated because this would be a burden on the heart. This conflates the innovator with the open sinner, a claim al-Madkhali denies. Moreover, by making such statements, whether he realizes it or not, al-Madkhali equates the innovator from the people of the Qiblah with the disbeliever. The one who must be hated unconditionally and not loved at all is the disbeliever. As ibn Taymiyyah says, "What leads to falsehood is itself false."
The reality of al-Madkhali's statement is nothing but a blend of Ahlus-Sunnah's stance on the sinner and the views of the Khawaarij and Mu'tazilah on the innovator. It is a newly introduced stance, a mixture between the methodology of Ahlus-Sunnah and the punitive approach of the Wa'eediyyah. This is clarified by ibn Taymiyyah's statement in "Majmoo' al-Fatawa," vol. 28, p. 209: "It should be known that a believer must be shown loyalty, even if he oppresses you and wrongs you, and a disbeliever must be shown enmity, even if he gives you and does good to you. For Allah, the Exalted, sent the Messengers and revealed the Books so that the entire religion would be for Allah, so that love would be for His allies and enmity for His enemies, honor for His allies, and humiliation for His enemies, reward for His allies, and punishment for His enemies. If a man combines good and evil, obedience and disobedience, Sunnah and innovation, he deserves loyalty and reward to the extent of his goodness, and enmity and punishment to the extent of his evil. Thus, one person can have both causes for honor and humiliation, like a poor thief whose hand is cut off for theft, and he is given from the treasury what suffices him for his needs. This is the principle agreed upon by Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah, as opposed to the Khawaarij, Mu'tazilah, and those who agree with them."
Which agreement should we rely on? This one mentioned by shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah, the most knowledgeable among the later generations about the beliefs of the Salaf and the innovators, or what al-Madkhali mentioned, who does not have significant knowledge of the methods of inference from the words of the scholars? This will become clearer in the third principle.
Al-Madkhali, with his extremism in declaring people as innovators and his refusal to mention the good deeds of those he criticizes, whether rightly or wrongly, coupled with his absolute hatred for them, leads him to oppose them in a manner very similar to how one would oppose disbelievers. This is something that imam 'Abbaad ibn 'Abbaad al-Khawaas (may Allah have mercy on him) warned against when he said: "Do not carry hatred towards the innovator, for the corruption of their innovation does not extend beyond them. However, your excessive hatred can lead to greater corruption in yourself." This was narrated by ad-Daarimi in his Sunan in the introduction.
Perhaps this explains their coldness, which is more frigid than the poles, towards the issues and calamities faced by Muslims.
The Third Principle: The methods of deduction and the meanings of statements, whether clear or ambiguous, general or specific, explicit or implicit, unrestricted or conditional, abrogating or abrogated, should only be used to understand the words of Allah and His Messenger, not the words of scholars. He argued this by citing imam Ahmad's multiple narrations, stating that it is not appropriate to apply the general to the specific or the unrestricted to the conditional. He claimed that this approach was invented by those who wanted to deny that Sayyid Qutub adhered to the concept of the unity of existence and considers this invention a deviation in methodology.
This principle that al-Madkhali has established, shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah described it as an innovated (muhdath) view and opposed to the consensus (ijmaa'). He said in Majmoo' al-Fatawa (Vol. 31, pp. 136-137):
"What is surprising is that some people think that the implication (mafhoom) is a proof in the words of the Legislator but not in the words of people, similar to analogy (qiyaas). This is against the consensus of the people. For people either say that the implication is among the meanings of the words, or they say it is not among them. This distinction is innovated (muhdath). Then, those who say it is a proof say it is a proof in speech in general. They base their arguments on the speech of people, what the linguists mentioned, and rational evidences that show anyone who considers it that the implication is like the indication of generality, unrestrictedness, and restriction. It is an indication from the meanings of the words, and this is evident in the words of the scholars."
This view is further confirmed by looking at the lengthy jurisprudential discussions in the books of wills, emancipation, endowments, divorce, oaths, and testimonies, as well as the books on jurisprudential principles. You will see how the scholars apply these principles in their discussions, not only in the words of scholars but also in the words of the general public.
This is also evident from the early and contemporary scholars when they explain texts, especially jurisprudential ones, considering both their explicit (mantooq) and implicit (mafhoom) meanings. An example is the statement by Jamaal ad-Deen Abu Zakariyya al-Ansari as-Sarsari in praise of ibn Qudaamah and his four jurisprudential books along with the Rawdah:
"They indicate the explicit meaning most clearly, and they take the implicit meaning in the best manner."
Moreover, shaykh al-'Uthaymeen, in his book "al-'Ilm," described Abu Butayn as someone who considered the explicit and implicit meanings of "ar-Rawd al-Murbi'," which is also the approach al-'Uthaymeen himself took in his commentary "al-Mumti'."
This stance that al-Madkhali denies when multiple opinions are narrated from Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) in a single issue has been established by more than one Hanbali scholar in their books on jurisprudence and its principles. Scholars like ibn Qudaamah in "al-Mughni," ibn Muflih in "al-Furoo'," and ibn Badraan in "al-Madkhal ila Madhhab al-Imam Ahmad" (pp. 136-137) have adopted it. Even in the matter of abrogation (naskh), ibn Muflih (may Allah have mercy on him) in "al-Aadaab al-Shar'iyyah" considered one of Ahmad's statements to be abrogated by another when he said, "And what the earlier ones adhered to from Ahmad’s statement is abrogated by what came before it" (Vol. 1, p. 227) under the section on looking at what may lead to misguidance and doubt.
The use of these principles by scholars to understand the words of other scholars is extensive and cannot be enumerated due to its vastness. How can it not be, when most methods of deduction are derived from the Arabic language, as noted by ash-Shaafi'ee (may Allah have mercy on him) and other scholars of the principles of jurisprudence? This was previously mentioned in the words of ibn Taymiyyah. This confirms al-Madkhali’s ignorance of the science of jurisprudence and its related disciplines, including the principles of jurisprudence and jurisprudential maxims, especially within the Hanbali madhhab.
If we understand al-Madkhali’s statement in this principle, we realize the reason behind his criticism of several scholars and preachers merely because of an apparent meaning attributed to them, and the potential misinterpretation of their words. His rigidity in criticism, even if it doesn’t excuse him or clear his record from the charges against him without verification, is evident. Ishaaq ibn 'Abdur-Rahman mentioned, as found in "ad-Durar" (Vol. 12, p. 445), that the likely interpretation of a scholar’s words should be based on their explicit meaning. This is a matter agreed upon by scholars without dispute; otherwise, the result would be what ibn Taymiyyah said in "Majmoo' al-Fatawa" (Vol. 12, p. 487): "In reality, they suffered from general terms in the words of the imams, similar to how the early ones suffered from general terms in the texts of the Shari'ah." He also said in "as-Saarim al-Maslool" (Vol. 2, p. 512): "Adopting the views of jurists based on generalities without referring to their explanations and what their principles necessitate leads to abhorrent views."
Thus, what al-Madkhali asserts undermines trust in his knowledge and renders him unfit for learning from, as it exposes him to fall into reprehensible views in various sciences by understanding scholars' words contrary to what they intended. His invalid principles, especially the second one, likely stem from this corrupt foundation. This matter is conclusively affirmed in his fourth principle, which will be explained later.
Al-Madkhali's approach contradicts itself particularly on the issue of explicit and ambiguous texts. In his book "Bayaan Fasaad al-Mi'yaar," he criticized his opponents for following the ambiguous statements of ibn Taymiyyah. Similarly, in his book "Ibtaal Mazaa'im Abi'l-Hasan fee al-Mujmal wal-Mufassal," he criticized al-Ma'ribi for clinging to ambiguous statements of scholars. This is an acknowledgment from him that there are ambiguous statements in the words of others besides Allah and His Messenger, without admitting his mistake or showing a significant difference between explicit and ambiguous statements and other methods of deduction.
Not only this, but after coming across ibn Taymiyyah's statements regarding the application of the general over the specific and the unrestricted over the restricted, al-Madkhali claimed that if ibn Taymiyyah had known the consequences of his words, he would not have said them. He argued that if this was a foundation from him, then what he meant by the general and specific and the unrestricted and restricted was only within the same context. This interpretation from al-Madkhali might be conceivable regarding the general and specific, and the unrestricted and restricted within the same context. However, it is inconceivable for the explicit and the implicit, the clear and the ambiguous, and the general and the specific in the case of separate contexts, as known in the principles of jurisprudence.
Al-Haafidh ibn Hajar (may Allah have mercy on him) was right when he said, "When a person speaks in a field outside his own expertise, he brings forth these wonders." How could shaykhul-Islam (ibn Taymiyyah) refrain from such speech when he was preceded by the consensus he mentioned? If this response were not so brief, we would have presented many examples from scholars before and after ibn Taymiyyah up to our contemporary times. You can refer to many of these in the treatise "al-Jawaab al-Akmaal 'ala Haml al-Mujmal 'ala al-Mufassal" by al-Ma'ribi, which is the fourth treatise in the second volume of his book "ad-Difaa' 'an Ahlil-Ittibaa'."
Moreover, ibn Taymiyyah clarified what refutes al-Madkhali’s interpretation of his words in both the general and specific contexts. In his book "al-Istiqamaa" (Vol. 1, p. 113), while discussing the innovators, he said, "The ambiguous words from their speech should be understood in a way that aligns with the rest of their speech." Similarly, regarding the unrestricted and restricted, as mentioned previously in his book "as-Saarim al-Maslool," he stated, "What clarifies the unrestricted and explains its intent is the restriction."
In this context, Rabee' al-Madkhali made another mistake. When he encounters ambiguous statements from a scholar, where the statement could imply both truth and falsehood, he addresses it only by rejecting this type of statement. Rejecting it is correct, but he neglects to clarify the speaker's intent—whether it was meant truthfully or falsely—based on his third principle. He permits making excuses for the speaker only by considering their commendable biography.
In such a case, it is necessary to examine the statement from two perspectives: from the linguistic perspective by clarifying the flaws in its structure regardless of the speaker's intent, which could be misleading and potentially imply both truth and falsehood, as this is characteristic of the statements of the Ahlul-Kalaam innovators, as described by imam Ahmad: "They speak with ambiguous statements, deceiving the ignorant people by confusing them." Not only this, but also from the perspective of understanding the speaker's intended meaning and purpose, whether it is truthful or false, not only by looking at their character but also by reconciling their various statements.
As al-'Allaamah ibnul-Qayyim (may Allah have mercy on him) said in "Madaarij as-Saalikeen": "The same word can be uttered by two people: one intends by it the greatest falsehood, while the other intends pure truth. The consideration is given to the way of the speaker, his path, his doctrine, and what he invites to and debates about." Thus, if the intention is truthful, it should be accepted but expressed in legitimate terms. If it is false, it should be rejected. This approach is well-known from the methodology of ibn Taymiyyah in his refutations.
Al-Madkhali overlooked this and considered it conflicting with the first aspect, thinking that it is impossible to combine both. This is clearly evident in his book "Ibtaal Mazaa'im Abi'l-Hasan fee al-Mujmal wal-Mufassal," where he specifically discusses this issue. Among his points is that when ibn Taymiyyah and ibnul-Qayyim excused Abu Isma'eel al-Harawi and denied that he endorsed the doctrine of "unity of existence," they did so by considering his biography, not by reconciling his ambiguous statements with the clear ones. This implies that his statements cannot be interpreted to clarify the ambiguous aspects or determine the speaker’s intent.
Ibn Taymiyyah's words refute this erroneous principle, stating in his response to al-Bakri: "It is known that the explicit interpretation of a speaker’s statement overcomes the ambiguous part, and the clear statement takes precedence over the metaphorical. When there is a clear expression indicating a meaning, and an ambiguous expression contradicting it or suggesting otherwise, the clear statement is not overridden by the ambiguous one, especially if it leads to disbelief unless due to extreme ignorance."
He also reiterated this in "al-Istiqamaa" and in his fatwas (Vol. 2, p. 640). Ibnul-Qayyim, in describing the state of the heretic at-Tilmisaanee, one of those who commented on "Manaazil as-Sa'ireen" by al-Harawi, said in "Madaarij as-Saalikeen," describing al-Harawi's words: "But the words are ambiguous and met a heart filled with unification," which shows that he addressed the ambiguity.
Furthermore, al-Ma’ribi collected their statements in his previously referenced treatise, refuting al-Madkhali's claim. How can someone with such contradictions speak with knowledge and justice in criticizing and evaluating individuals and groups?
Thus, how can someone in this condition justly and knowledgeably critique and evaluate individuals and groups?
And the strange thing about al-Madkhali is that despite his insistence on attributing the belief in the unity of existence (wahdat al-wujood) to Sayyid Qutub (may Allah have mercy on him and forgive him) al-Madkhali himself acknowledges in his book "Islamic Lights" that Sayyid Qutub explicitly denounced this belief in "In the Shade of the Qur'an"! — And yet, Rabee' refuses to declare against against him specifically. Is this something that could be excused by ignorance or misinterpretation? Has Rabee' not come across the words of ibn Taymiyyah and some of the scholars of Da'wah an-Najdiyyah and others about those who espouse this vile belief? Or is it due to some misguided sense of piety?
Since al-Madkhali cited Sayyid Qutub's statement about the unity of existence, he also referenced imam ash-Shawkani's statement in his book "The Decisive Swords Against the Bonds of the People of Unity": "Muslims unanimously agree that such statements are not to be interpreted except as they are stated," then he must have come across the words of jurists who declared specified takfeer espousing this vile belief. So why then this reprehensible hesitation, especially when he denies any ambiguity in Sayyid Qutub's words and considers his statements in the Surahs of al-Hadeed and al-Ikhlaas in "In the Shade of the Qur'an" as explicitly clear?
If this indicates anything, it shows that al-Madkhali is deceiving himself and is not confident in what he says. Regarding al-Madkhali's use of ash-Shawkani's statement, the complete statement is in response to those who defend al-Hallaaj, ibn 'Arabi, and others among the heretics: "Then know, secondly, that your claim that they mean something different from the apparent meaning of their words is a lie and compounded ignorance. They have explicitly stated that they mean nothing other than the apparent meaning. This is Imam ash-Sakhawi in his biography of ibn 'Arabi saying that ibn 'Arabi explicitly stated in his 'Futuhaat al-Makkiyyah' that his words are to be understood as they are. He also said in 'ad-Daw' al-Laami' in the biography of the scholar al-Hussayn ibn 'Abdur-Rahman al-Ahdal: 'It was said to me about ibn 'Arabi that he said: My words mean exactly what they appear to mean.' So how do you claim, O deluded one, that he does not intend what the apparent meaning of his words indicates?! This is his statement and his words in his 'Futuhaat' and 'Fusoos al-Hikam' are clear Arabic, not ambiguous. Similarly, other followers of his doctrine, how can the scholars of the Shari'ah not understand their apparent meanings?! This is another of your gross errors. If you say: We interpret their words, even if they explicitly state their apparent meaning, we would say: Then you should also interpret the words of the Jews, Christians, and all other polytheists in the same way as ibn 'Arabi and his followers, as we will clarify for you. Muslims unanimously agree that statements are not to be interpreted except as they are explicitly stated unless there is an obstacle preventing such interpretation, and the explicit statement that the intended meaning is the apparent one prevents the interpretation of the words of the infallible (Prophet), so how can the words of ibn 'Arabi be interpreted after his explicit statement? So look, O poor one, at what ignorance has done to you and to what level your love for these people has taken you. Allah, Glorious and Exalted, has judged the Christians as disbelievers for saying that He is the third of three, so how can He not judge these people by what their statements necessitate?" Thus, the consensus he quoted pertains to words with apparent meanings that do not allow for forced interpretation, unlike problematic authentic hadiths in our minds that contradict other texts, apparent meanings, and consensuses. Since they came from the infallible (Prophet), they must be interpreted and aligned with the known truth from clear evidence, even if with difficulty and strain.
Those who disagree with al-Madkhali do not agree that Sayyid Qutub's words are as clear as he claims, but rather see them as ambiguous, having aspects that oppose them. They apply to him ibn Taymiyyah's saying: "But an ambiguous statement from someone known to be a believer is not interpreted as disbelief without evidence or indication. How then if the context indicates the correct meaning?" (Fatwas, Vol. 2, p. 640). His previous statement: "And whenever an explicit statement is issued in a certain meaning, and a vague statement that contradicts that meaning or does not contradict it, it should not be interpreted in opposition unless it leads to disbelief, except in cases of extreme ignorance." Hence, al-Madkhali's citation of ash-Shawkani's words is out of context.
When interpretation in the view of later scholars means diverting the word from its apparent meaning due to a contextual clue, the context of ash-Shawkani's words indicates that he does not prohibit interpreting the apparent meanings of scholars' words unrestrictedly, but rather refers to apparent meanings without any diverting clues, as is the case with the words of al-Hallaaj and ibn 'Arabi. The clues indicate that the apparent meaning is intended, even if ibn 'Arabi did not explicitly state that his words should be taken literally. This means that if there is a diverting clue, it is permissible to interpret the word away from its apparent meaning. The most famous example of this is imam Shu'bah ibn al-Hajjaaj's statement: "This hadith distracts you from remembering Allah and from prayer, so will you desist?" When imam Ahmad was asked about it, he said, "Perhaps Shu'bah was fasting, and when he pursued hadith and sought it, he weakened and did not fast, or he wanted to do some good deeds but could not because of the pursuit of hadith. This is its meaning."
Al-Haafidh al-Khateeb al-Baghdadi (may Allah have mercy on him) said in "The Excellence of the People of Hadith," under the chapter: "Mentioning narrations that might be difficult for listeners to understand and clarifying their meanings and aspects": "I say, it is not permissible for anyone to say that Shu'bah discouraged the pursuit of hadith. How can that be when he reached the level to be called 'Commander of the Faithful in Hadith'?" Al-Khateeb then provided other similar statements from scholars and explained their meanings.
Al-Madkhali acknowledged this about Shu'bah by saying, "He did not mean the apparent meaning of his words," which is an acknowledgment from him that ash-Shawkani's words are not unrestricted. This is supported by ibnul-Qayyim's statement in "I'laam al-Muwaqqi'een" under the chapter "Three Types of Words": "When the speaker's intention behind the meaning of the words becomes clear, or there is no apparent intent that contradicts his words, it is obligatory to take his words at face value."
The implication is that if there is an apparent intent that contradicts his words, then his words should not be taken at face value. However, how can al-Madkhali understand this when he sees the authority of the implicit meaning as being exclusive to the words of Allah and His Messenger, not to the words of scholars?
Ash-Shawkani's statement also implies that the words of scholars have an apparent meaning, and the apparent meaning includes general and unrestricted statements. It is well known that the general can be specified and the unrestricted can be restricted, and this is not considered interpretation. Ibn Taymiyyah mentioned in his book "al-Eemaan" that the earlier scholars used to call general and unrestricted terms as ambiguous. Thus, ash-Shawkani's words are not in al-Madkhali's favor. Ibnul-Qayyim (may Allah have mercy on him) rightly said in "Madaarij as-Saalikeen": "How often do people attribute false doctrines to scholars due to their limited understanding."
And when shaykh Rabee’, may Allah guide him, introduced these innovative principles into the methodology he deems correct, specifically the second and third principles, his opponents from among the Salafis regarding these two principles, based on his first principle, are in the same situation as the Khawaarij, being Salafis in creed but innovators in methodology. This means they are outside the circle of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah unless this innovation is hidden in his view, at which point he requires proof to declare a specific person as an innovator. This is if he considers the mistake of his opponents in the second and third principles to be a hidden innovation. However, this possibility is contradicted by his labeling of the author of "Al-Mi'yaar" who opposed him in the second principle as a "hidden partisan" before proof was presented to him. Thus, the question remains regarding his stance on those who oppose him in the third principle. 'Umar ibnul-Khattaab (may Allah be pleased with him) said, "The Sunnah is what Allah and His Messenger have prescribed. Do not make the mistake of opinion into a Sunnah for the Ummah." This is akin to the actions of the people of innovation who create principles without any divine authority, then declare those who oppose them as innovators or disbelievers, and pledge allegiance based on these principles.
The matters for which the Salaf declared opponents as innovators have been clarified by them, may Allah have mercy on them, and they did not leave things to chance. Whoever adheres to their path is upon the truth, and whoever deviates from their way brings falsehood. Imam Sufyan ibn 'Uyaynah (may Allah have mercy on him) explained the creed of Ahlus-Sunnah by saying, "The Sunnah is ten things. Whoever adheres to them has completed the Sunnah, and whoever abandons any of them has abandoned the Sunnah."
Imam Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) said in the principles of the Sunnah: "And from the necessary Sunnah, which whoever leaves any of its aspects has not said it and does not believe in it, is not from its people."
Imam Harb al-Karmaani (may Allah have mercy on him) said in his issues: "These are the views of the people of knowledge and the companions of the Athar and the adherents of the Sunnah who hold onto it, who are emulated therein from the time of the companions of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) until this day. I have met those I have met from the scholars of the people of the Hijaaz, Shaam, and elsewhere, who adhere to it. So whoever opposes anything of these views or criticizes them or their proponents, he is a contrary innovator, outside the group, deviating from the methodology of the Sunnah and the path of truth."
And imam Abu 'Uthmaan as-Saabooni (may Allah have mercy on him) said in his book "Creed of the Companions of Hadith": "My brothers in the faith asked me to compile for them sections on the principles of the religion that were upheld by the leading Imams of the faith, scholars of the Muslims, and the righteous predecessors. They guided people to these principles at all times and warned against anything that contradicts or opposes them. The believers who follow and confirm the truth and piety have allied themselves in adhering to these principles and opposed those who deviate from them. They declared as innovators and disbelievers anyone who held beliefs contrary to these principles." This indicates that some of these innovations are considered heretical, and this categorization is a specific application within a general context.
Imam ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (may Allah have mercy on him) said in his book "al-Jaami'": "Among the matters on which the Ummah has consensus in matters of the religion, and among the Sunnah, those who oppose them are considered innovators and deviators." None of the statements of any of these scholars, in their explanation of the principles of the beliefs of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah, include anything resembling what Rabee’ al-Madkhali has introduced into the methodology and used to declare his opponents as innovators. And Allah is the Helper.
Shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) said in "Majmoo' al-Fatawa" (vol. 35, p. 414): "The innovation that categorizes a man as one of the people of whims and desires is what is well-known among the scholars of the Sunnah as contrary to the Quran and the Sunnah, like the innovations of the Khawaarij, the Raafidhah, the Qadariyyah, and the Murji'ah." In addition to what the imams of the Salaf mentioned, anything that has the same underlying principles, even if not explicitly stated, is also considered an innovation. This has been previously explained in the words of ibn Taymiyyah and ash-Shaatibi (may Allah have mercy on them) in the context of refuting the first principle. For those who want to delve deeper into the statements of scholars on this matter, refer to the book "Tabseer al-Khalaf bi-Daabit al-Usool allati man Khaalafahaa Kharaja 'an Manhaj as-Salaf" by Ahmad an-Najjaar.
If we applied the third principle to al-Madkhali himself, we would make him an Ash'ari in most of the Divine Attributes because he restricted the description of the attributes of the people of the Sunnah to their being eternal in type and contingent in specifics only to the Attribute of Speech, and not to the rest of the Voluntary Attributes, under the pretext that this is what is stated only in the Attribute of Speech. This contradicts what ibn Abi'l-'Izz (may Allah have mercy on him) stated in his explanation of at-Tahaawi's Creed on pages 124-125, where he said: "These Attributes of Action and Voluntary Attributes, and the like, such as creation and shaping, giving life and death, grasping and extending, folding, rising, coming and descending, anger and satisfaction, and the like, which He described Himself with, and His Messenger described Him with, although we do not comprehend their exact nature and reality, which is their interpretation, we do not interpret them with our opinions, nor imagine them according to our whims. But their basic meaning is known to us, as imam Maalik (may Allah be pleased with him) said when asked about the Ayah [interpretation of the meaning] 'then He rose over (Istawâ) the Throne (really in a manner that suits His Majesty)': How did He rose over? He said: The istiwaa' is known, and the how is unknown. Even though these states occur at one time and not another, as in the hadith of intercession: 'My Lord is angry today in a way that He has never been angry before and will never be angry afterwards.' For this occurrence in this sense is not impossible, and it is not said that it happened after it was not there."
Had he understood that their saying 'eternal in type, contingent in specifics' means that they are eternal because they are inherent in His essence, and they occur according to His will, he would not have uttered such words. Therefore, Ahlus-Sunnah sometimes refer to Voluntary Attributes as inherent Active Attributes, as ibn Taymiyyah sometimes does. Then, describing Allah's Speech as eternal in type, contingent in specifics, necessitates that the will and desire are likewise. Ibn Taymiyyah explicitly stated this in "Majmoo' ar-Rasaa'il wal-Masaa'il" Volume 1, page 182, and in "Majmoo' al-Fatawa" Volume 16, pages 301-303.
It is not hidden the statement of ibn al-Mubaarak and Ahmad ibn Hanbal (may Allah have mercy on them) regarding the Attribute of Allah's Speech: "He has always been speaking when He wills and how He wills." Refer to this if you wish in shaykh al-Bassaam's explanation of "Buloogh al-Maraam" called "Tawdeeh al-Ahkaam" Volume 2, page 434, for the saying of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) about the rain: "It has newly come from its Lord," narrated by Muslim.
If we applied this principle of his once again, we would make him face two impossible options regarding the issue of the Prophet's (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) vision of his Lord during the Mi'raaj: either that he is a Sufi who claims to see Allah with his heart like the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) did, or that he denies the reality of the vision confirmed by ibn 'Abbaas, distorting its meaning. Al-Madkhali, after mentioning ibn 'Abbaas' statement that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) saw his Lord with his heart, claimed that he too sees Allah with his heart, then interpreted this heart vision as knowing Allah, believing in Him, and that He is above the heavens. This is extremely erroneous and unacceptable, as it implies that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) did not know his Lord or believe in Him and His exaltedness before or even after the Mi'raaj. We seek refuge in Allah from such confusion.
Ibn Hajar (may Allah have mercy on him) said in Fath al-Baaree, Volume 9, page 590 (Daar al-Fikr edition): "The intended meaning of seeing with the heart is the vision of the heart, not just the acquisition of knowledge, because he (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) was always knowledgeable of Allah. Rather, those who affirmed that he saw Him with his heart mean that the vision that occurred was created in his heart as vision is created in the eye for others. Vision does not require a specific condition, even though it is usually created in the eye."
It also necessitates denying that this matter is a unique characteristic of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) according to ibn 'Abbaas' statement: "Are you astonished that the friendship was for Ibraaheem, the speech was for Moosa, and the vision was for Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him)?" This was narrated by an-Nasaa'i in al-Kubra and al-Haakim in al-Mustadrak, and authenticated by ibn Khuzaymah, al-Haakim, and ibn Hajar. It also implies belittling the Salaf since how could there be a disagreement among them regarding the issue of vision if this was its true nature?! Alternatively, it might be said that al-Madkhali denies the reality of this vision, thus distorting its meaning in the manner of the people of distortion among the Mutakallimeen, such as the Ash'aris and others. In any case, the apparent meaning of Rabee' al-Madkhali's words is a distortion of the Prophet's (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) vision of his Lord with his heart. Those fanatically following shaykh Rabee', may Allah guide them, should consider what they would say if someone other than their shaykh made such a statement!
Furthermore, if we applied this principle to him a third time, we would make him both a Mu'tazili and a Murji' at the same time! He intended to mention what the Murji'ah agree upon with Ahlus-Sunnah but failed to express it well. He wanted to mention the meaning cited by ibn Taymiyyah in Majmoo' al-Fatawa, Volume 13, pages 38-39, and claimed that Ahlus-Sunnah agree with the Murji'ah that action is a condition in faith and in enforcing the threat for major sins. It is well known to anyone with the slightest knowledge of sects that the enforcement of the threat for major sins is one of the five fundamental principles of the Mu'tazilah. As for his claim that Ahlus-Sunnah and the Murji'ah agree that action is a condition in faith, the term "condition" here either means a condition of validity, which the Murji'ah do not say, or a condition of perfection, which is the view of the Ashaa'irah and Maaturidiyyah, not the view of Ahlus-Sunnah. This is if we applied his principle to him.
Section on Clarifying Rabee' al-Madkhali's Views on the Details of the Issue of Faith:
If we want to understand the true position of shaykh Rabee' himself, this requires some expansion while striving to adhere to my condition of brevity as much as possible. The reason for this expansion is that I have not come across anyone who has attempted to comprehensively cover his views on this matter. Thus, I sought Allah's help in this endeavor. To accurately understand his statements on this issue, recognizing the truth and correctness in the matter, as well as identifying the error and its cause, it is necessary to first present his view in a general manner, and then detail it in three points.
Regarding the general statement, al-Madkhali has consistently opposed the use of the following terms: "condition of perfection," "condition of validity," and "type of action" in discussing the issue of faith, particularly criticizing the term "type of action" for its ambiguity and the fitnah (trial) caused by the use of these terms. Initially, he believed that abandoning actions entirely was not disbelief. However, he later retracted this view, acknowledging it as incorrect, and asserted that the correct view is that abandoning all actions is disbelief. This change occurred after he read an article titled "Alerting the Negligent to the Consensus of Muslims that Abandoning the Type of Action is Disbelief in Religion" by Hamad ibn 'Abdul-'Azeez al-'Ateeq. Nevertheless, he did not fully accept the consensus and continued to defend the second view, considering it a valid position within the Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah, and that its proponents had predecessors. He also denied the accusation of Irjaa' (postponement) against them entirely and accused those who did not provide a precedent for this ruling of being Khawaarij.
To support his stance, he attributed to shaykhul-Islam Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab and his descendants (may Allah have mercy on them) the view that not performing any actions at all does not constitute disbelief, relying on their statements which al-Madkhali misunderstood. By doing so, he intended to say that his return to the correct view was not a shift from the view of the Murji'ah to the view of Ahlus-Sunnah, but rather a return from a lesser-preferred view among Ahlus-Sunnah to a more-preferred one.
During this phase, he wrote the following: a comment on an old fatwa in which he mentioned his retraction from his previous statement (no date available), a question: "Does denying the actions related to the four pillars constitute denying the type of action and make one a Murji'? And is the type of action limited to the four pillars excluding the two testimonies?" and his articles "A Word of Truth about the Type of Action" and "Brotherly Advice to Shaykh Faalih al-Harbi" under the section: "It is not from Irjaa'," written in 1425 AH, and his article "The Dangerous Principles of Faalih al-Harbi and Their Consequences," written in 1428 AH, and his book "Exposing the Lies, Distortions, and Treachery of Fawzi al-Bahrayni," written in 1429 AH.
After this period, he reverted to his original position once more, considering the view that abandoning all actions is disbelief as a new statement. His reasoning was that the disagreement among the predecessors was only about declaring the abandonment of prayer and other practical pillars of Islam as disbelief, and since they unanimously agreed not to declare the abandonment of anything beyond that as disbelief, this invalidates the view that abandoning all actions is disbelief. He considered the hadiths on intercession to be explicit texts on the matter, and this was the last position al-Madkhali adopted in his article "A Deluded Pretender Accuses the Majority of Ahlus-Sunnah and Their Imams of Irjaa'," responding to 'Aadil al-Hamdaan in two parts in the year 1433 AH. Here is the clarification of that and a detailed refutation of his errors.
(1) Response to his rejection of Irjaa' in general and in detail for those who say abandoning all actions is not disbelief, and claiming that those who attribute this to them Irjaa' without evidence are khaariji:
Shaykh Rabee' has repeatedly denied that those who say abandoning all actions is not disbelief, but rather a major sin and a deficiency in faith, align with the Murji'ah, as long as they affirm that faith is composed of both statement and action, which increases and decreases. He argues that the Murji'ah do not consider actions as part of faith at all and do not acknowledge the increase and decrease of faith.
I do not understand how shaykh Rabee' completely denies their alignment with the Murji'ah. Although they differ from the Murji'ah in their explicit statements, they agree with them in essence. This is evident from imam Abu Thawr's argument against the Murji'ah, where he said: "If they say that Allah wanted both acknowledgment and action from them, then if He wanted both, how can you claim that one can be a believer with one without the other, even though He wanted both? Consider a man who says, 'I will do everything Allah commands but will not acknowledge it.' Would he be a believer? If they say no, then it is said to them: 'If he acknowledges everything Allah commands but does nothing of it, is he a believer?' If they say yes, it is said to them: 'What is the difference?' And you have claimed that Allah wanted both. If one can be a believer by doing one without the other, then it should be possible to be a believer by doing the other without acknowledgment. There is no difference between the two..." This is narrated by al-Laalikaa'i (No. 1590) and also by 'Abdullah ibn imam Ahmad in as-Sunnah (No. 745) from imam ibn 'Uyaynah, who said about the Murji'ah: "They say that faith is a statement. We say that faith is a statement and action. They have made abandoning the obligations a sin like committing prohibited acts, but it is not the same because committing prohibited acts without considering them permissible is a sin, whereas deliberately abandoning obligations without ignorance or excuse is disbelief."
Shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah said in "al-Eemaan al-Awsat": "It has become clear that religion must include both words and actions, and that it is impossible for a man to be a believer in Allah and His Messenger in his heart, or in his heart and tongue, without performing any obligatory outward actions, such as salah, zakah, fasting, or other obligations. This is not just because Allah has commanded them, like performing trustworthiness or telling the truth or being just in division and judgment without faith in Allah and His Messenger. This does not remove him from disbelief, as polytheists and people of the book see the necessity of these actions. Therefore, a man cannot be a believer in Allah and His Messenger without any of the obligations specifically imposed by Muhammad. Whoever says that obligatory faith can exist without any of the obligatory actions, whether they consider those actions a necessary consequence or a part of it, is mistaken. This is a clear error and the heresy of the Murji'ah, which the Salaf and Imams condemned and spoke against harshly."
From his statement, it is understood that the term "obligatory faith" is not limited to the complete obligatory faith that does not nullify faith by its absence. It also applies to the fundamental faith, which nullifies faith by its absence, as is clear from the context of his words. The idea that abandoning all actions is not disbelief is exactly the meaning attributed by ibn 'Uyaynah, Abu Thawr, and ibn Taymiyyah to the Murji'ah. This stance can be categorized under the Murji'ah's fundamental view on faith rather than the Ahlus-Sunnah's view. Those who adopt this stance have aligned themselves partly with the Ahlus-Sunnah and partly with the Murji'ah. They have outwardly stated the Ahlus-Sunnah's view but have agreed with the Murji'ah in essence, creating a hybrid position that vacillates between the two views.
The consideration remains regarding their judgment: should it be said about them that they are Murji'ah and not among Ahlus-Sunnah, or should it be said that they are among Ahlus-Sunnah but with some Murji'ah tendencies? Imam Ishaaq ibn Raahuwayh (may Allah have mercy on him) clarified this when he was quoted by Harb al-Karmaani in the issues of Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Ishaaq ibn Raahuwayh, page 377: "The Murji'ah have exaggerated to the extent that some of them say that a person who abandons the obligatory prayers, fasting of Ramadan, zakat, hajj, and most of the religious duties while admitting them, they are the Murji'ah who there is no doubt about, we do not consider them disbelievers, their matter is left to Allah, he is among those who hope for Allah's mercy. Then, there are different kinds among them: some say we are absolute believers and do not say 'with Allah's permission', and they view faith as words and deeds. These are the best among them. Others say faith is words confirmed by actions, and that actions are not part of faith but are necessary duties, and faith is the word..." [Quoted from: Al-Iman Inda al-Salaf by Muhammad Khudayr, vol. 1, pp. 300-301]
Among contemporary scholars who considered that those who say faith is words and actions and that actions are a condition of completeness or that abandoning actions entirely is not disbelief are Murji'ah, are ibn Baaz, Bakr Abu Zayd, Abdur-Rahman al-Barraak, al-Ghunaymaan, and al-Fawzan among others. This refutes the accusation of Khaarijiyyah that al-Madkhali tries to intimidate his opponents with, based on the saying of more than one of the Salaf that the Khawaarij call Ahlus-Sunnah Murji'ah. In fact, shaykh al-Fawzan considered those who believe that not declaring the disbeliever who abandons all actions entirely is one of the opinions of Ahlus-Sunnah to be liars, and that they have lied about the Salaf.
This is evident from what shaykh 'Abdul-'Azeez ar-Raajihee mentioned in al-Jazeerah newspaper, issue no. 12506: "I asked our shaykh, imam ibn Baaz, may Allah have mercy on him (in 1415 AH), in one of his lessons about actions: are they a condition for the validity of faith or a condition for its completeness? He replied: Some actions are conditions for the validity of faith, faith is not valid without them like prayer; whoever abandons it becomes a disbeliever. Other actions are conditions for completeness; faith is valid without them but the one who abandons them is disobedient and sinful. I asked him: those who did not declare the one who abandons prayer among the Salaf, did they consider action a condition for completeness or validity? He replied: No, rather action is considered a condition for validity among all, except that they differed on what faith is valid with. Some said it is prayer, and this is agreed upon by the companions as narrated by 'Abdullah ibn Shaqeeq, while others said otherwise, but the essence of action must be there for the validity of faith according to all the Salaf. Therefore, faith for them is words, actions, and belief, and it is not valid except by combining them."
This consensus among the Salaf, as mentioned by shaykh ibn Baaz, is also confirmed by imam ash-Shaafi'ee, who said: "The consensus among the companions, the followers, and those after them, and those we met, is that faith is words, actions, and intentions; none of these three suffices without the others." This is also narrated by imam al-Aajurri in ash-Shari'ah and imam Ibn Battah al-Akbari in al-Ibaanah al-Kubra, both under the chapter: Statement of Faith and Its Obligations.
Thus, those who claim that faith is valid without actions, and that belief and words suffice, have adopted the very essence of the Murji'ah’s view. Imam Wakee' ibn al-Jarraah said: "The Murji'ah are those who say that acknowledgment suffices without actions; whoever says this has perished," as mentioned by ibn Taymiyyah in Majmoo’ al-Fataawa, vol. 7, p. 308. Therefore, it cannot be said that these people do not agree with the Murji'ah, at least in part of their view. They may not be fully Murji'ah, but they certainly hold a significant error in their statement and have some tendencies towards the Murji'ah.
This is why shaykhul-Islam Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab (may Allah have mercy on him) objected to what was mentioned by al-Haafidh ibn Hajar in "Fath al-Baaree" in his explanation of the Book of Faith, and attributed his statement to the Mutakallimeen as in "ad-Durar as-Saniyyah", vol. 1, pp. 50-51. There is nothing objectionable in ibn Hajar's words except his attribution to the Salaf the statement that faith is words and actions and that actions are a condition for completeness. This statement is that of the Ashaa'irah and Maaturidiyyah, who sought to interpret the Salaf's words according to their own corrupt principles. Ibn Taymiyyah highlighted this approach in matters of belief, including the issue of faith, where they said that actions are a condition for completeness and that abandoning actions is not disbelief—both statements essentially mean the same thing, as many of their leaders have made clear, including the most recent ones such as al-Bayjoori in his "Sharh Jawharat at-Tawheed" and Abu Zaahid al-Kawthari in his commentary on "at-Tanbeeh" by imam al-Malti (may Allah have mercy on him). For those who wish to delve into their views, refer to "Baraa’at Ahl al-Hadith was-Sunnah min Bid’at al-Murji'ah" by al-Kathiri, pp. 264-270 and 275-288. Some Ashaa'irah express this view by saying that actions are branches of faith, not its core, as stated by ash-Shahrastaani in "al-Milal wan-Nihal", vol. 1, p. 101.
And if the difference between Murji'ah al-Fuqahaa' and the imams of the Salaf has been misunderstood by some esteemed individuals, both in the past and present, thinking it to be merely verbal due to their lack of understanding and comprehension of all the words of ibn Taymiyyah on the matter, this is entirely inapplicable to the dispute between the Salaf and the Ashaa'irah regarding the concept of faith. This misunderstanding occurs only among those who are ignorant of the true stance of the Salaf. This is despite the majority of the Ashaa'irah, who are considered extreme Murji'ah, acknowledging the increase and decrease of faith, as mentioned by the Ash'ari as-Saawi in his commentary on Jawharat at-Tawheed, which has become their established belief. This view of the Ashaa'irah was also conveyed by Qaadhi Abu Ya'la (may Allah have mercy on him) in his book "Masaa'il al-Eemaan". It is not as al-Madkhali claims in his article "Brotherly Advice to Shaykh Faalih al-Harbi" that the Ashaa'irah do not believe in the increase and decrease of faith at all. This indicates that shaykh Rabee's knowledge of the various sects' views on faith is incomplete and insufficient. Such a person is not safe from unknowingly agreeing with the people of desires in their falsehood. One who does not distinguish between good and evil is likely to fall into it.
Al-Madkhali's belief that considering the increase and decrease of faith prevents describing those who say that abandoning all actions is not disbelief as agreeing with the Murji'ah is due to his attachment to the apparent statement of imam Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) regarding those who say: "Faith increases and decreases," saying: "This person is free from Irjaa'" as narrated by al-Khallaal, and the statement of imam al-Barbahari (may Allah have mercy on him) in "Sharh as-Sunnah": "Whoever says faith is words and actions that increase and decrease has left Irjaa' in its entirety." However, this does not apply universally; it is only for those who say this verbally and mean it in its true sense. As for those who say it verbally but interpret it in a way that aligns with the Murji'ah principles, like Shabaabah, one of the advocates of the Murji'ah, who says faith is words and actions but then interprets it to mean otherwise, imam Ahmad's true statement about him will be clarified later. Therefore, it cannot be said that he is free from Irjaa' merely for saying that faith is words and actions. Otherwise, it would necessitate exonerating the majority of the Ashaa'irah from Irjaa' for saying that faith increases and decreases, and it would necessitate exonerating those who say faith is words and actions but also claim that abandoning the heart's actions entirely is not disbelief. It would also necessitate exonerating those who say the Qur'an is the word of Allah, not created, but also claim that Allah does not speak with a voice, thus agreeing with the Jahmiyyah.
Regarding the terms "genus of action," "condition of validity," and "condition of completeness," as for the term "genus of action," sometimes al-Madkhali claims it is a logical philosophical term, other times he claims its meaning is ambiguous, and sometimes he rejects it on the pretext of sufficing with what has been narrated from the Salaf!
As for his claim that this is a logical philosophical term and has no basis in the Arabic language, it is enough to refute him that it was used by the imams such as ash-Shaafi'ee (may Allah have mercy on him) in "al-Umm" when discussing the rulings on usury, and by ibn Jareer (may Allah have mercy on him) in his commentary on al-Faatihah. The eminence of ash-Shaafi'ee in the language and his warning against the language of Aristotle, meaning Aristotelian logic and philosophy, is well-known. The term "genus" is originally Arabic, but the Greek logicians gave this term a different meaning than its original meaning when translating philosophical books, just as they did with the term "logic" itself. For those who wish to see the scholars' warnings about this matter, refer to "al-Hadd al-Aristotel" (Aristotelian definition), its philosophical origins, and its scientific effects by Sultan al-'Umayri, pp. 452-458, where he states about the terms "genus" and "species": "These two terms are among those used in both Arabic and Islamic sciences and among logicians, but with different meanings. The meaning of 'genus' and 'species' among the logicians is different from their meaning among the Arabs and the imams."
As for al-Madkhali's claim that it is ambiguous and his objection to those who interpret the phrase "abandoning the genus of action" to mean abandoning action entirely, arguing that their saying "genus of dinar," "genus of dirham," "genus of grains," and "genus of humans" does not imply all dinars, all dirhams, all grains, and all humans, this is quite astonishing. The generality is not required when "al" is used with the word to indicate reality, as in dinar, dirham, grains, and humans. However, it is required when it indicates comprehensiveness, as is known in the 'Ilm al-Kalaam. The use of the term "genus" in those expressions implies generality because "genus of dinar," for example, is a singular addition that generalizes all dinars, as is known in the principles of jurisprudence.
Moreover, scholars have commonly used the term "genus of dinar" or "genus of dirham" or "genus of grains" in the context of usury in jurisprudence, as used by ash-Shaafi'ee and those who followed him among the fuqahaa'. Does al-Madkhali want to tell us that these fuqahaa' meant that usury does not apply to all of these, but only to some and not others?
Regarding his statement that this term was not used by the Salaf, this is incorrect. Shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) used it when explaining the words of the Salaf. He said in "al-Eemaan Al-Awsat" (p. 48): "Those said 'word and action' to indicate its inclusion of the genus and did not intend to mention the attributes of words and actions." He also said: "The apparent Islam is of the genus of action" (Majmoo' al-Fatawa, vol. 7, p. 339). He further said: "The genus of actions is a necessary part of the faith of the heart" (Majmoo' al-Fatawa, vol. 7, p. 616). Imam Ibn Rajab, may Allah have mercy on him, in "Jaami' al-'Uloom wal-Hikam," in his explanation of the Hadith of Jibreel when speaking about the convergence of Islam and faith, said: "Then the intended meaning of faith would be the genus of heart's belief, and Islam the genus of action."
This term was also used by contemporary scholars such as shaykh ibn Baaz (may Allah have mercy on him) as mentioned previously, shaykh Saalih al-Fawzan, and shaykh Saalih ibn 'Abdul-'Azeez Aal ash-Shaykh.
Regarding the terms "condition of validity" and "condition of completeness," it is important first to clarify the intended meaning of "condition" here. In this regard, shaykh 'Abdur-Rahman al-Barraak said in his response on faith and its nullifiers (p. 12): "It should be known that the intended meaning of 'condition' here is its broader sense, which is that the reality depends on its existence, whether it is a pillar within it or external to it. What is said here to be a condition in faith is part of faith itself." Additionally, al-'Allaamah ibnul-Qayyim (may Allah have mercy on him) in his book "as-Salah wa Hukm Tarkihaa" (p. 64), stated: "The question remains regarding prayer: is it a condition for the validity of faith? This is the essence of the matter. The evidence we mentioned and others indicate that nothing is accepted from a servant except with it. It is impossible for profit to remain without the capital. If one loses it by abandoning prayer, it is the key to his records and the mainstay of his success. If he loses all his deeds, even if he performs them externally."
Thus, it becomes clear that shaykh al-'Uthaymeen's (may Allah have mercy on him) statement in preventing the use of the term "genus of action" on the grounds that it was not used by the Salaf, which Rabee' relied upon, requires reconsideration. Additionally, Rabee' made a mistake when he generalized the statement that considering action as a condition of validity is a view of the Khawaarij without further explanation. The difference between those who used the term "genus of action" among Ahlus-Sunnah, such as shaykh ibn Baaz (may Allah have mercy on him) and the view of the Khawaarij, is that Ahlus-Sunnah mean by it that some action of the limbs is necessary for a person to be a Muslim, even if it is a single obligatory act. In contrast, the Khawaarij view every individual obligation as a condition of validity, such that if a person abandons a single obligation of any kind, they are deemed a disbeliever.
As for the term "condition of completeness," even though shaykh Rabee' denies that Ahlus-Sunnah hold the view that action is a condition of completeness and refutes Khaalid al-Anbari's attribution of this to them, he mentioned that Ahlus-Sunnah say that action is part of faith. However, I do not think it escaped his notice that al-Anbari does not see a conflict between the two statements. This is because he does not mean the technical, usooli sense of "conditionality." What he means is that abandoning all actions of the limbs entirely is not considered disbelief, as is known from those who hold this view. Therefore, the real disagreement between the statement that absolves its proponents of the accusation of Irja' and the statement of al-Anbari and others is merely a verbal dispute. This means that Rabee' al-Madkhali is actually refuting the Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Iftaa, both during the life of shaykh ibn Baaz, when he was its head, and after his death.
During his lifetime (may Allah have mercy on him) the committee issued a fatwa in the book "Dabt adh-Dhawaabit fee al-Eemaan wa Nawaaqidihi" by az-Zahrani before his repentance. After ibn Baaz's death, they issued fatwas regarding 'Ali al-Halabi, which spread the discussion about this issue. Al-Madkhali does not dare to openly admit this explicitly and instead conceals it by denouncing those who use the term "condition of completeness" and was one of the first to deny it. He does not reject their usage because of the incorrectness of their meaning but because of the fitnah associated with using this term and because it was not used by the Salaf. Therefore, he outwardly disagrees with their statement but in reality, covers up for them.
(2) Rabee' al-Madkhali's Confusion after Adopting the View that Abandoning All Actions Constitutes Disbelief:
Let me start by noting that every statement I will mention about al-Madkhali, without citing its source, is from his book "Exposing the Lies, Distortions, and Betrayals of Fawzi al-Bahrayni." It should be known that al-Madkhali began reconsidering his stance after reading an article titled "Warning the Unaware of the Consensus of Muslims that Abandoning the Genus of Action is Disbelief in Religion" by Hamad ibn 'Abdul-'Azeez al-'Ateeq. However, al-Madkhali differentiated between the phrase "abandoning all actions constitutes disbelief" and the phrase "abandoning the genus of action constitutes disbelief." He accepted the first and rejected the author's use of the second, continuing to dispute its intended meaning.
Al-Madkhali mentioned that the author described a specific scenario to explain abandoning the genus of action. He stated that one should not doubt the disbelief of a person who, after uttering the shaahadah, remained idle, never performing any good deeds, neither with their tongue nor their limbs, and never returned to uttering the shahaadah again after the obstacle was removed. This interpretation by the author is misleading, and al-Madkhali failed to recognize the flaw in it. This specific scenario is not the point of contention, nor is it what the Salaf meant when discussing the ruling on abandoning action. Their discussions, may Allah have mercy on them, were limited to physical actions and not verbal statements, focusing on the actions of the limbs rather than the actions of the heart, even though they are interrelated.
You only need to look at the examples given by ibn Raahuwayh, al-Aajurri, ibn Battah, and ibn Taymiyyah, who also limited their discussions to obligatory actions of the limbs and not recommended actions, contrary to al-Madkhali's interpretation of the meaning of abandoning all actions. Ibn Taymiyyah further specified that it concerns actions unique to what our Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) brought, as opposed to those shared between Muslims and disbelievers.
As for the statements, what is their relation to abandoning action? Are statements considered actions in this context? This is exactly what imam Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) described as a vile statement. Al-Khallaal narrated in "Kitab as-Sunnah" (No. 982) from Abu Bakr al-Athram, who said: "I heard Abu 'Abdullah being told about Shabaabah, 'What does he say?' He replied, 'Shabaabah called to Irjaa'.' He then narrated a statement from Shabaabah worse than these statements I have ever heard anyone say. He said, 'Shabaabah says that if one speaks, he has acted.' Abu 'Abdullah then said, 'This is a vile statement, I have never heard anyone say this, nor has it reached me.'"
Al-Madkhali did not suffice with his claim that the term "genus of action" is ambiguous. He also wanted to interpret the statements of scholars who used this term in a way contrary to their intended meaning. For instance, he distorted the statement of shaykh ibn Baaz (may Allah have mercy on him) which was narrated by shaykh ar-Raajihee (as previously mentioned), claiming that what ibn Baaz meant by abandoning the genus of action was specifically abandoning prayer. However, the context of the question and answer between shaykh ar-Raajihee and ibn Baaz rejects this confusion. It would imply that shaykh ibn Baaz attributed to all the Salaf the view that abandoning prayer alone constitutes disbelief, which contradicts his response.
Additionally, al-Madkhali misinterpreted another response of ibn Baaz, where he was asked about the view that not declaring someone who abandons one of the pillars of Islam as a disbeliever is the view of the Murji'ah. Ibn Baaz denied this being the view of the Murji'ah, and al-Madkhali interpreted his statement as referring to someone who abandons all actions entirely.
If al-Madkhali truly wanted to understand the intended meaning of shaykh ibn Baaz's statements, he only needed to ask his senior students, especially the one who posed the question. They would be more knowledgeable about his intended meaning.
Shaykh Rabee' al-Madkhali criticized those who added phrases like "abandoning the genus of action is disbelief" or "none of them suffices without the other" or "faith decreases until nothing remains of it" to the definition of faith, portraying this as a necessity in the definition, otherwise, a person would be considered an innovator. This is how he represented his opponents' views. Regardless of their intention, there is a difference between clarifying additions in the definition based on the Salaf's statement "faith is words and actions, increases and decreases," and explaining their statement.
It is not necessary, when defining faith, to add, for example, their saying: "and intention and following the Sunnah," or their saying: "and words without actions are disbelief," or their saying: "none of them suffices without the other." Although this is permissible and there is no harm in it, and several Salaf Imams did so without any objection from anyone, the real objection and criticism lie against those who explain their statement "faith is words and actions, increases and decreases" contrary to what was narrated from the Salaf.
Al-Madkhali did not address this distinction in his refutation of his opponents. He did not mention the difference between the two matters to avoid confusion between them. That is, the difference between a clarifying addition in the definition and explaining the definition. The former is permissible and not obligatory, while the latter is obligatory. A person will not be free from Irjaa' until they establish the following meaning in their explanation of the first part of the definition of faith: that it is the saying of the heart, the saying of the tongue, the action of the heart, and the action of the limbs, and that none of these four suffices without the other.
Furthermore, whoever abandons the actions of the limbs — meaning the obligatory actions among them, the pillars of Islam and other obligations — and does not perform any of them is a disbeliever, whether it is said that the one who abandons one of the practical pillars of Islam is a disbeliever or not. As for the second part of the definition of faith, al-Madkhali objected to his opponents' statement that it is necessary to say that faith decreases until nothing remains of it to distinguish between Ahlus-Sunnah and the Murji'ah. He cited those from Ahlus-Sunnah who said that faith decreases but never completely vanishes.
Al-Madkhali did not succeed in reconciling the two statements, considering those who said that faith decreases until nothing remains of it as a small minority and that this is a rare occurrence, and that the ruling is for the prevalent, not the rare. This, despite al-Madkhali sometimes saying that faith decreases until nothing remains of it, just as he says it decreases until the least, least, least weight of an atom remains, as he reported about himself. This statement is far from being accurate!!
Before delving into the correct view on this matter, you should know that the statement "faith decreases until nothing remains of it" has been reported from al-'Awzaa'ee as narrated by al-Laalikaa'i, and from ibn 'Uyaynah as narrated by al-Aajurri, ibn Battah, and as-Saabooni in "The Creed of the People of Hadith." Ishaaq ibn Raahuwayh also narrated it, as did al-Khallaal (may Allah have mercy on them all). Al-Barbahari affirmed it in "Sharh al-Sunnah."
The statement that "faith decreases but does not completely vanish" was cited by al-Madkhali from ibn Taymiyyah, ibn Rajab, and ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab (may Allah have mercy on them all). There is no real difference between the two statements. The reason for the decrease in faith is either due to abandoning obligatory duties or committing prohibitions. Ahlus-Sunnah differentiate between the two: they declare disbelief for abandoning all obligatory duties but not for committing prohibitions, contrary to the Murji'ah, as previously mentioned from ibn 'Uyaynah. Shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) said about Murji'ah al-Fuqahaa's stance on major sins: "These do not dispute with Ahlus-Sunnah and Hadith regarding the judgment in the Hereafter but rather dispute regarding those who said but did not act" (Minhaaj as-Sunnah, vol. 5, p. 284).
This is also contrary to the Khawaarij who declare disbelief for committing prohibitions and for abandoning a single obligatory duty, regardless of what it is. Therefore, when someone says "faith decreases until nothing remains of it," they mean if the reason for the decrease is the abandonment of obligatory duties. As imam Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "Its increase is in actions, and its decrease is in abandoning actions" (narrated by al-Khallaal). Imam ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (may Allah have mercy on him) said in "ar-Risaalah": "It increases with the increase of actions, and decreases with their decrease, so it includes the decrease and the increase."
So, whenever one abandons an obligatory duty, their faith decreases, and if they abandon all obligatory duties, no faith remains. Those who say that faith decreases but does not completely vanish mean that the reason for the decrease is committing prohibitions, which do not amount to disbelief or polytheism. If you reflect, shaykh Rabee', on the words of ibn Taymiyyah, ibn Rajab, and ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab, which you cited, you will find this clear. They said this in the context of refuting the Khawaarij, who claimed that faith does not allow for reduction; if part of it is lost, all of it is lost. This is the detailed explanation of the second part of the definition of faith according to the majority of Ahlus-Sunnah: faith increases and decreases. Praise be to Allah for His guidance.
Thus, it becomes clear that those who refrain from saying that faith decreases until nothing remains and say instead that it decreases but does not completely vanish, mean this in the context of abandoning all obligatory duties, not in the context of committing prohibitions. Their statement implies that abandoning all actions entirely is not disbelief, which is the view of the Murji'ah and is not held by any of the imams of the Salaf. Since the decrease in faith occurs due to abandoning obligatory duties and committing prohibitions, and committing prohibitions does not completely nullify faith, unlike abandoning all obligatory duties which does, it is correct to say unanimously that faith decreases until nothing remains, as stated by al-'Awzaa'ee, ibn 'Uyaynah, and ibn Raahuwayh when explaining increase and decrease.
Al-Barbahari mentioned this in "Sharh as-Sunnah" when explaining the creed of Ahlus-Sunnah. This was an explanatory addition in the definition of faith, unlike the second statement "it decreases but does not completely vanish," which is not known from any of the early Imams of the Salaf. It is not permissible to make such a statement without specifying it in the context of committing prohibitions. Those Imams who said it did so in the context of refuting the Khawaarij. The only exception is what was reported from imam ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (may Allah have mercy on him) in his book "al-Jaami'" (p. 110): "It increases with obedience and decreases with disobedience, decreasing from the perfections of faith without nullifying it." By disobedience here, he means committing prohibitions, which is confirmed by his subsequent statement: "There is no statement except with action, no statement and action except with intention, and no statement, action, and intention except in accordance with the Sunnah."
It is astonishing that shaykh Rabee' pointed out the difference between the two causes for the decrease in faith in another context when explaining ibn Taymiyyah's statement on the correlation between the outward and inward aspects of faith: "If he does not act according to its requirements and implications, it indicates its absence or weakness." He clarified that one cause for the absence of faith is the complete abandonment of action, and another cause for its weakness is committing major sins. However, he did not apply this distinction when he wanted to explain the view that faith decreases until nothing remains of it versus the view that faith decreases but does not completely vanish.
This was due to his insistence that the opinion that abandoning all actions is not disbelief falls within the views of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah, and that it is not the view of the Murji'ah. He maintained that Ahlus-Sunnah are divided on this issue: some consider it disbelief, while others do not, likening this disagreement to their disagreement on abandoning one of the practical pillars of Islam. Although he did not attribute the view that abandoning all actions is not disbelief to Ahmad, ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibnul-Qayyim as he did in his article "Arrogant Ignoramus...," which will be addressed later, he inevitably attributed this view to ibn Taymiyyah, ibn Rajab, and ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab by allowing their statement that faith decreases but does not completely vanish without clarifying whether they meant that the decrease was due to committing prohibitions or abandoning obligatory duties.
By not differentiating, al-Madkhali implies that their statement includes both causes since an unrestricted statement implies generality. Ibn Taymiyyah mentioned that if a mufti does not consider such a distinction when asked a question, it indicates that he is not a jurist. Thus, al-Madkhali's implication is that ibn Taymiyyah, ibn Rajab, and ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab did not believe that abandoning all actions constitutes disbelief, which they never stated. This means al-Madkhali fails to recognize the connection between saying that faith decreases until nothing remains and the ruling that abandoning all obligatory duties is disbelief. He also fails to recognize the connection between saying that faith decreases but does not completely vanish and the view that committing prohibitions without deeming them permissible is not disbelief, contrary to the Khawaarij.
Al-Madkhali's attempt to reconcile the view that abandoning all actions is disbelief with the unrestricted statement that faith decreases but does not vanish without detailing the matter is a contradiction and a combination of opposites. This contradiction is evident in his acceptance of both views: that faith decreases until nothing remains and that it decreases but does not vanish, not as detailed explanations but as interchangeable options, citing that both statements were reported from Ahlus-Sunnah. Furthermore, al-Madkhali explicitly attributed the view that abandoning all actions is not disbelief to shaykhul-Islam Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab and his descendants, based on a misunderstanding that will be addressed in the third point. He also attributed this view to other scholars in his article "Arrogant Ignoramus...".
Even if we assume this understanding is correct, this view contradicts the consensus, which means al-Madkhali rejects not only the consensus reported by ash-Shaafi'ee but all the consensuses found in Hamad ibn 'Abdul-'Azeez al-'Ateeq's article "Warning the Unaware of the Consensus of Muslims that Abandoning the Genus of Action is Disbelief in Religion." This implies that he insists on remaining among the unaware. Allah's help is sought.
Al-Madkhali explicitly stated in his article "Dangerous Principles of Faalih al-Harbi and Their Consequences" that he rejects the consensus transmitted by ash-Shaafi'ee from the Companions and the Followers, which concludes with the statement "None of the three suffices without the other." He argued that this is opposed to the consensus that ash-Shaafi'ee himself conveyed from the Companions that faith is words and deeds, and increases and decreases without the previous detail, meaning without saying, "None of the three suffices without the other."
In response to this flimsy argument, it was said: "We challenge you to provide the exact wording of his statement without the detailed explanation," as it is known that ash-Shaafi'ee's statement is quoted by scholars like ibn Rajab in "Fath al-Baaree" and "Jaami' al-'Uloom wal-Hikam" in meaning, not verbatim. It is not known that ash-Shaafi'ee conveyed the consensus of the Companions on this matter, despite the numerous transmissions from him defining faith, which you later compiled in your article "Arrogant Ignoramus...". Besides what was conveyed by al-Laalikaa'i and ibn Taymiyyah from him, which you deny, it becomes clear that your objection based on his statement is actually against you, not for you, so enough with the deception.
Moreover, there is nothing in ash-Shaafi'ee's statement, whether verbatim or what scholars conveyed in meaning, that mentions the consensus of the Companions that faith increases and decreases. So, where did you get this from?! Al-Madkhali’s denial did not stop here but included other objections in his article "Arrogant Ignoramus...", whose refutation will be addressed in the third point.
Among Rabee' al-Madkhali's fallacies is attributing the statement to shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) that the disagreement between Ahlus-Sunnah and Murji'ah al-Fuqahaa' is purely verbal. He makes this claim in an unrestricted sense, despite not accepting it himself and considering the disagreement to be a substantial and meaningful one, following shaykh ibn Baaz (may Allah have mercy on him). Al-Madkhali quoted ibn Taymiyyah from "Majmoo' al-Fatawa," vol. 3, p. 357, vol. 7, p. 297, vol. 13, p. 38, and from the book "al-Eemaan," p. 337, saying that the statement of Murji'ah al-Fuqahaa' is one of the lightest innovations, that their innovation is not severe, that it pertains to statements and actions rather than beliefs, that they were initially considered among Ahlus-Sunnah, and that most of their disputes were verbal, much of it concerning names and terms rather than judgments.
However, nothing al-Madkhali cited indicates that the disagreement is purely verbal. Ibn Taymiyyah's statement that most of the disputes are verbal implies that some of it is substantial. How could Rabee' comprehend this when he prevents the use of inferential methods to understand the scholars' statements? Ibn Taymiyyah's intended meaning is confirmed when he said: "...it becomes clear that the dispute may be verbal" (Majmoo' al-Fatawa, vol. 13, pp. 38-43). In "Al-Eemaan al-Awsat," he stated: "Then, after that, people disputed the name of the believer and faith, much of which was verbal and much of which was substantial. The leading jurists did not dispute any of the mentioned judgments, although some were more knowledgeable in religion and more upright than others. They disputed names, like their dispute over faith, whether it increases and decreases, whether it includes exceptions, whether deeds are part of faith, and whether the sinful Muslim is a complete believer or not" (Majmoo' al-Fatawa, vol. 7, pp. 504-505). Could it be imagined that ibn Taymiyyah considers these disputes to be merely verbal?
Ibn Taymiyyah also specified that the dispute is considered verbal if they acknowledge and agree on the correlation between the outward and inward aspects of faith, and that internal faith must be accompanied by outward actions, and that the absence of the latter implies the absence of the former. This is mentioned in "Majmoo' al-Fatawa," vol. 7, pp. 554-555, 575, 579-580, 584, and in "al-Eemaan," p. 281 (as quoted in "Baraa'at Ahl al-Hadith..." by Al-Kathiri, pp. 259-264).
If you understand this, consider carefully ibn Taymiyyah's statement on the view of Murji'ah al-Fuqahaa' regarding the ruling on major sinners: "These do not dispute with Ahlus-Sunnah and Hadith regarding his ruling in the Hereafter but rather dispute about those who said but did not act" (Minhaaj as-Sunnah, vol. 5, p. 284). Recall the previous explanation on the issue of the decrease of faith, and the falsehood will become clear to you. As for ibn Taymiyyah's statement on the nature and rank of their innovation, it should not be understood as downplaying the innovation of Irjaa'. He quoted ibn al-Mubaarak and Yoosuf ibn Asbat saying about the Murji'ah that it is one of the roots of innovations, meaning one of the foundations of the deviant sects of people of innovation and desires. Ibn Taymiyyah said: "Their innovation is similar to the disagreements of the jurists on subsidiary issues. Much of their speech returns to disputes over terms and names, which is why discussing their issues is called the chapter of names. This is a dispute among fuqahaa' but relates to the fundamentals of religion, so the disputant is considered an innovator" (Majmoo' al-Fatawa, vol. 12, p. 485). He also quoted in vol. 7, p. 394, the statements of the Salaf about them, including an-Nakha'ee's statement that their trial is more feared for the Ummah than the trial of the Khawaarij.
Rabee' al-Madkhali also criticized his opponents for accusing those who say that the disagreement with Murji'ah al-Fuqahaa' is merely verbal of being Murji’ah themselves. During this, he attributed this view to ibn Taymiyyah and ibn Abi'l-'Izz. However, the correct view is that this statement implies that abandoning actions entirely is not disbelief, which is the view of the Murji'ah. This is because it is impossible to reconcile the view that actions are part of faith with the view that excludes actions from faith without leading to that conclusion. This is what imam ibn Abi'l-'Izz al-Hanafi (may Allah have mercy on him) fell into in his commentary on at-Tahaawiyyah when he considered the disagreement to be purely verbal. He stated that abandoning actions is disobedience, not disbelief. This was a mistake on his part, may Allah have mercy on him. Hence, it is necessary to clarify that anyone who commits to this conclusion has adopted the doctrine of the Murji'ah, unlike those who do not commit to it because adhering to a doctrine is not the same as the doctrine itself.
In his article "Is it permissible to accuse of Irjaa' those who say that faith is fundamental and actions are complementary (secondary)?", al-Madkhali quoted statements from ibn Mandah in "al-Eemaan," al-Marwazi in "Ta'dheem Qadr as-Salah," ibn Taymiyyah, and others indicating that faith has branches, some of which are fundamental and others are complementary. This is all true, and they stated that the faith of the heart and the tongue is fundamental, while the actions of the limbs are complementary, and faith cannot be complete without its branches. However, if this last sentence is taken out of its proper context, which those Imams intended as an explanation of what faith is composed of, it becomes a potentially ambiguous statement that could imply both truth and falsehood. The falsehood it might imply, if taken out of context, is attributing the view that abandoning the actions of the limbs entirely is not disbelief to those imams.
This erroneous meaning is part of what Abu'l-Hasan al-Ash'ari claimed when he said, "Faith is the affirmation of the heart, and as for the statement of the tongue and the actions of the limbs, they are its branches" (as mentioned by ash-Shahrastaani in "al-Milal wan-Nihal," vol. 1, p. 101). How can the statement of those who exclude actions from faith be equated with the statement of those who include it as part of faith?
Although Rabee' al-Madkhali did not use this statement to attribute this erroneous meaning to them, he does not deny this possibility despite his opponents criticizing him for it, and despite some understanding this flawed meaning from the words of those Imams. He merely denies this for himself, stating that the statements of those Imams do not contradict the view that actions are fundamental, saying, "If some of Ahlus-Sunnah say: actions are fundamental or a pillar, we do not denounce them, for it is secondary in one aspect and fundamental in another, secondary in the sense that it is built upon what is in the heart, and fundamental considering it itself."
This meaning mentioned by al-Madkhali is agreed upon among Ahlus-Sunnah and is not the view of some of them, except if he means by that those who explicitly stated it. However, when al-Madkhali only defends himself and does not refute the misconception for those who misinterpret the statements of those Imams, while denying that the one who says abandoning actions entirely is not disbelief agrees with the Murji'ah, it becomes necessary to clarify this misconception.
The response to this distortion of the imams' words is that this erroneous meaning is refuted by the Salaf's general usage of the terms "completion" and "perfection" for what a thing cannot be valid without. This includes the statement of ad-Dahhaak ibn Muzaahim (may Allah have mercy on him): "Faith is in Allah, the Last Day, the Angels, the Book, the Prophets, belief, and acceptance of what comes from Allah, and submission to His decrees and judgments, and satisfaction with His destiny. This is faith, and whoever is like that has completed his faith" (narrated by ibn Battah in "al-Ibanah al-Kubra," no. 837).
Ibn 'Uyaynah (may Allah have mercy on him) stated in "The Foundations of Belief": "The Sunnah is ten things; whoever possesses them has completed the Sunnah, and whoever leaves any of them has left the Sunnah." Ibn Taymiyyah said about faith in "Majmoo' al-Fatawa," vol. 7, p. 637: "Its foundation is in the heart, and its completion is outward action. Unlike Islam, whose foundation is outward and its completion is in the heart."
What al-Marwazi, ibn Mandah, ibn Taymiyyah, and others stated was not meant to explain the ruling on completely abandoning actions but to describe the structure of faith, what it is composed of, its beginning, and what completes it, in refutation of the innovators among the Khawaarij, Mu'tazilah, and various Murji'ah sects who agreed that faith is a single entity, not branches. Some Murji'ah sects added that faith is complete even without actions.
It is evident that entering into faith is by the belief of the heart and the declaration of the two testimonies, and since this beginning is considered fundamental, as it is a condition for the acceptance of the actions of the limbs, the actions of the limbs then come to complete it. This is the meaning of them being secondary, as they arise from it, and everything that contrasts with the fundamental is secondary. Its implication is that faith will not be complete except by fulfilling all individual obligations. If one performs some and neglects others, their faith will not be complete. It does not imply that if one abandons them entirely, faith does not vanish.
When the potential for a strong interpretation exists, the argument falls apart, especially when it contradicts the reported consensuses. The question is about what action is necessary for one to remain in faith, which the Salaf's Imams unanimously agreed upon, whether they declared the abandonment of one of the four practical pillars of Islam as disbelief or not, that there must be action even if it is just one obligation from the actions of the limbs, otherwise one would be a disbeliever.
Al-Madkhali’s use of such statements to argue about the ruling on abandoning all outward actions entirely is an argument based on ambiguous words of the scholars, while neglecting their clear and definitive statements. The most deserving of being considered definitive among the scholars' statements are those that convey consensus — regardless of whether the conveyed consensus on a particular issue is correct or not, this is another matter. Even one of the scholars of Usool (jurisprudence principles) mentioned the agreement of Usool scholars that consensus cannot be specified by the Qur'an and Sunnah. This implies that citing consensus must be with precise, unambiguous wording.
However, an exception from the context of the three imams' statements is what al-Madkhali quoted from al-Marwazi's book "Ta'dheem Qadr as-Salah," where he narrated the statement of a group of hadith scholars without mentioning any specific names. Their apparent words include the ruling on abandoning actions entirely, unless there is an interpretation. They said: "The foundation of faith is acknowledgment and belief, and its completion is the perfection of actions with the heart and body. The opposite of acknowledgment and belief, which is the foundation of faith, is disbelief in Allah and what He has said, and the abandonment of belief in Him. The opposite of faith, which is action and not mere acknowledgment, is disbelief that does not take one out of the religion."
This is not a statement from imam al-Marwazi himself; rather, he confirmed the opposite. Perhaps those mentioned were the ones imam Ishaaq ibn Raahuwayh (may Allah have mercy on him) meant and judged them as Murji'ah. Whether or not ibn Raahuwayh specifically intended them, the fact that they considered the heart's actions part of faith but as a complement in the sense that faith does not disappear with its absence and one does not become a disbeliever by abandoning it is indeed the view of the extreme Murji'ah, including Jahmiyyah and Ashaa'irah. Their acknowledgment that the heart's actions are part of faith does not justify them, as most Murji'ah sects state that the heart's actions are part of faith, as mentioned by shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah. However, they deny the correlation between it and the actions of the limbs. Even the contemporary Murji'ah deny the statement that the heart's actions are a condition for the completeness of faith, not that faith disappears with its absence. So where is the investigation, O Rabee' ibn Haadee al-Madkhali?!
(3) Rabee’s Confusion After Returning to His Old View that Abandoning Actions Entirely is Not Disbelief:
After al-Madkhali filled a book and articles to prove that the ruling on completely abandoning actions is a matter of dispute among Ahlus-Sunnah, and after repeatedly stating that he believes that abandoning actions entirely is disbelief, he reverted to his previous view that abandoning actions entirely is not disbelief. He further claimed that considering it as disbelief is a new opinion. As I read his article, "An Arrogant Pretender Accuses the Majority of Ahlus-Sunnah and Their Imams of Irjaa'," in response to 'Aadil al-Hamdaan, in two parts, it seemed to me that I was reading an article written before he announced his return to the view that completely abandoning actions is disbelief.
However, when I checked the date of the article, I was shocked and astonished. Rabee’ al-Madkhali clearly stated that abandoning all outward actions is not disbelief, and that considering it as such is a new opinion. He claimed that the one who holds this view does not pay attention to the hadiths on intercession and the virtues of "There is no god [worthy of worship] but Allah." At the end of the second part, he said:
"And thus, Ahlus-Sunnah unanimously agree that not performing the four pillars of Islam is not disbelief. Whoever considers anything beyond that as disbelief is against their consensus and follows the path of the Khawaarij in considering major sins as disbelief in general. This condemns those who declare as disbelievers those who abandon all kinds of actions, intending by that the abandonment of all actions. This is a new opinion they have invented to fight Ahlus-Sunnah and to cause trouble for them. Due to the intensity of their tribulation and causing trouble for Ahlus-Sunnah, they added this principle and were not satisfied with declaring as disbelievers those who abandon prayer, which is sufficient for them to declare as disbelievers beyond that, because those who declared abandoning prayer as disbelief among the Salaf do not consider the deeds of the one who abandons it, regardless of what they are. Due to the extreme bias of these contemporary opponents of Ahl al-Sunnah, one can observe that they do not give any importance to the hadiths on intercession. The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) stated that those with even the slightest, slightest, slightest amount of faith in their hearts will be taken out of Hell, and that some people who have never done any good at all will be taken out of Hell. Allah says, 'By My Might, My Majesty, My Supremacy, and My Greatness, I will surely bring out from Hell those who say: There is no god [worthy of worship] but Allah.' The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) mentioned them after the intercession for those who are taken out of Hell among the workers who used to pray [salah], fast, and perform hajj."
And I have chosen to start the third point by quoting his statement at the end of the last article he wrote on this topic, so that no one doubts what we have said about the man. Now, let us address the most important doubts and mistakes that led al-Madkhali to fall into this predicament that brought him back into the mire of Irjaa' once again, after he had already brought people out of it. In the second part of his article, he used the hadith of intercession which mentions the command to bring out those who have the slightest amount of faith in their hearts. I do not understand where the methodology of Ahlus-Sunnah in deriving evidence from his mind has gone, nor where the practice of gathering all relevant texts on a single issue has disappeared to, nor where the adherence to the understanding of the righteous predecessors on the issue of faith has gone, which is the pivot of religion and the greatest matter upon which praise, blame, reward, and punishment are based, as described by ibn Taymiyyah, may Allah have mercy on him. This methodology seems to have flown away from al-Madkhali's mind in this great issue. If this approach he followed in deriving evidence is not following ambiguous texts, then what else could it be?
Where is he in relation to the narration of Abu Hurayrah that states the last group to be taken out of Hell will be recognized by the angels by the marks of prostration, which is found in Saheeh al-Bukhaari, no. 6574 and 7438, and Saheeh Muslim, no. 182? This narration clarifies the meaning of the phrase "those who did not do any good at all" narrated by Muslim, no. 183, from Abu Sa'eed al-Khudri. Imam ibn Khuzaymah (may Allah have mercy on him) said in his book Tawheed, vol. 2, pp. 727 and 732, refuting the Murji'ah: "The chapter: mentioning the proof that all the reports previously mentioned about the Prophet's intercession in bringing the people of Tawheed out of Hell are general phrases intended specifically... This phrase 'did not do any good at all' is of the type used by Arabs to negate the name of something due to its lack of completeness and perfection... Thus, the meaning of this phrase is that they did not do any good completely and perfectly as required and commanded." This meaning was also clarified in several places in his books.
Imam Abu 'Ubayd al-Qaasim ibn Sallaam (may Allah have mercy on him) mentioned this in his book Eemaan, and imam Muhammad ibn Nasr al-Marwazi (may Allah have mercy on him) in Ta'dheem Qadr as-Salah, where they stated that this was widespread in Arab speech. The accuracy of their statements is supported by the hadith of the man who killed ninety-nine people, narrated by Muslim, no. 2766, and the hadith of the man who used to relieve the debtor, narrated by Ahmad, no. 8715, and an-Nasaa'i, no. 4694, where both were described as having not done any good at all despite being described with actions that led to their salvation from punishment and Allah's pardon. This indicates that the Jahannamiyyeen (people destined for Hell) did not include those who completely abandoned physical actions.
Thus, we find that al-'Allaamah ibnul-Qayyim (may Allah have mercy on him) said in Shifaa' al-'Aleel: "As in the other phrase 'the slightest, slightest, slightest amount of faith' which is the belief in the messengers and submission to them by heart and limbs." This meaning agreed upon by our scholars is different from the meaning that al-Madkhali attributed to the hadith of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him): "The slightest, slightest..." and "did not do any good at all." Wasn't the reason for the deviation of the Murji'ah precisely this, relying on the linguistic meaning of faith without the explanation of the Qur'an and Sunnah and without adhering to the understanding of the Salaf as-Saalih?
How can you fall into the same mistake they did, follow their method in deriving evidence, and emphasize a possible linguistic meaning against contrary evidence, and not only that, but also attribute this false understanding to ibnul-Qayyim? All of this was stated in the second part of his article "Arrogant Ignoramus..." and he also attributed this to shaykhul-Islam Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab, claiming that he too did not consider the complete abandonment of actions to be disbelief, interpreting shaykh ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab's statement about not declaring disbelief for abandoning the four pillars of Islam, after the two testimonies, as clear evidence on the issue, similar to the way the people of innovation use ambiguous texts.
However, shaykh ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab has a clear statement on this matter in a book that has been widely explained, "Kashf ash-Shubuhaat," where he said: "There is no disagreement that Tawhid must be with the heart, tongue, and actions. If any part is missing, a person is not considered a Muslim. If he knows Tawheed but does not act upon it, he is a stubborn disbeliever, like Fir'awn, Iblees, and their kind." I do not know how al-Madkhali turned away from this statement to another, whether it was due to negligence or intentional ignorance! The matter will become clear later!!
Moreover, in his article, he made errors regarding several prominent scholars of Da'wah an-Najdiyyah (may Allah have mercy on them) attributing this opinion to them, while they have all stated the opposite. You can find their statements in the book "Eemaan According to the Salaf" by Muhammad al-Khudayr, volume 2, pages 43-52, and in the article "Cutting Off Arguments by Mentioning the Consensus and Decisive Texts That Deem Actions a Part of the Definition of Faith" by 'Abdullah al-Ghaamidi. Even imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (may Allah have mercy on him) was not spared from having this false statement attributed to him in both episodes, which is inconsistent with his acknowledgment of imam al-Humaydi’s statement.
Al-Khallaal narrated from imam al-Humaydi: "I was informed that some people say: If someone acknowledges the obligations of salah, zakat, fasting, and hajj, but does not perform any of them until he dies, or prays with his back turned to the qibla until he dies, he is a believer as long as he does not deny their obligations. I said: This is outright disbelief in Allah, contrary to the Book of Allah, the Sunnah of His Messenger, and the consensus of the Muslims. Allah said: 'Establishing prayer and giving zakat, and that is the correct religion.'" Hanbal said that Abu 'Abdullah (i.e., imam Ahmad) said or I heard him say: "Whoever says this has disbelieved in Allah, rejected His command, and contradicted the Messenger in what he brought."
The narration from Ahmad that states he does not declare a person who abandons one of the four pillars to be a disbeliever does not imply that he does not consider someone who abandons all of them to be a disbeliever. His intention was regarding someone who abandons some but not all. Thus, it follows that abandoning all the obligations indeed results in disbelief, as he is abandoning the four and more.
Al-Madkhali also claimed that their proof lies in the hadiths about the virtue of "Laa ilaaha ill'Allah" and intercession, and that these hadiths are among the arguments of the Murji'ah to exclude actions from the definition of faith, as ibn Taymiyyah mentioned. It is astonishing that al-Madkhali presents the hadiths of intercession as if they are definitive evidence on the matter in dispute, supporting his false understanding, while being ignorant of or ignoring the opposing evidence from the Sunnah and the interpretations of the Salaf regarding these hadiths, or deliberately overlooking it. He imagines that when Ahmad, ibn Taymiyyah, and ibnul-Qayyim encountered these hadiths, they had no choice but to submit to them and abandon their stance on declaring a person who abandons prayer or physical acts of worship to be a disbeliever.
Does he think these scholars were unaware of the mutawaatir hadiths on intercession before they declared the disbelief of those who abandon prayer or all physical acts of worship? In the end, he points out that these scholars have other statements contradicting the ones he cited and falsely attributes his interpretation to them, claiming the preferred view is the one he holds. He asserts that declaring the abandonment of all actions to be disbelief is a new stance, which is laughable. Why not first prove that what you cited is their definitive statement and what you referred to as ambiguous, or at least show that both statements are equivalent and then explain how they reconcile?
Since this is not the case, let us tell you: If you have turned away from their explicit statements on this issue and have instead resorted to incorrect inference and imaginary scenarios, assuming them to be true, and suffice with citing their views on abandoning one of the pillars of Islam or on the hadiths of intercession, and merely hint at their other statements without even bothering to mention some of them and interpret them, then how can you assert that their reliable opinion aligns with yours? This is nothing but willful blindness and following desires and ambiguities.
Then, what would you say about ibnul-Qayyim's statement in "Shifaa' al-'Aleel," which is an explanation of the hadith of intercession: "As in the other phrase 'the slightest, slightest, slightest amount of faith,' which is the belief in the messengers and submission to them by heart and limbs." Or the statement of Ibn Khuzaymah in his book "Tawheed," who was keen on reconciling differing hadiths. Will you still claim they could only submit to it and comply with it?! Perhaps their statements will provide you with clarity.
Since al-Madkhali considers the opposing opinion to be a new one, why do we not hear a whisper from him about the fatwas of the Senior Scholars Committee regarding 'Ali al-Halabi, or what shaykh al-Barraak wrote in "A Response Regarding Faith and Its Nullifiers," or shaykh al-Fawzan in "Questions on Faith," or shaykh ar-Raajihee in "Questions and Answers on Faith and Disbelief"? Is it fear for his reputation and the possibility of his exposure?
Not only that, but al-Madkhali concluded his article by denying the wording of the consensus reported by ash-Shaafi'ee, which ends with: "…one of the three cannot suffice without the other," as mentioned in his book "al-Umm." Both al-Laalikaa'i in "Sharh Usool I'tiqaad" and ibn Taymiyyah in "al-Eemaan" reported this. Al-Madkhali objected to its authenticity on five grounds: one of them being that this phrase does not exist in the printed version of "Al-Umm." This shows poor etiquette towards al-Laalikaa'i and ibn Taymiyyah, as they directly quoted from "al-Umm," and they are closer to the time of ash-Shaafi'ee and more knowledgeable about the manuscripts and methods of verification than we are.
Imam al-Laalikaa'i (may Allah have mercy on him) studied the Shaafi'ee madhhab under imam Abu Haamid al-Isfara'ini, known as the third Shaafi'ee. He quotes from "al-Umm" with knowledge and understanding. It would have been better to say that perhaps one of the later Ashaa'irah removed it from some copies, and there are many of them among the later Shaafi'iyyah, and it is these that were used in the printed version. I wonder if al-Madkhali realizes what he is saying, as his statement aligns with what al-Kawthari said when denying that al-Baaqillaani, the Ash'ari, affirmed the attribute of elevation in his book "at-Tamheed," criticizing ibn Taymiyyah and ibnul-Qayyim for attributing this to him. Both statements come from the same source, and Allah is the one whose help is sought.
He also questioned who else reported this consensus in such terms other than what is reported from ash-Shaafi'ee. If you are unaware, that is a misfortune, and if you know, the misfortune is greater. Among those who reported the consensus in similar terms are imam al-Muzani in "as-Sunnah," where he mentioned the consensus at the end, and imam al-Aajurri in "ash-Shari'ah" under the chapter: "The Statement that Faith is Belief in the Heart, Affirmation by the Tongue, and Action by the Limbs," and ibn Battah al-Akbari in "al-Ibaanah al-Kubra" under the chapter: "Clarification of Faith and its Obligation, and that it is Belief in the Heart, Affirmation by the Tongue, and Action by the Limbs and Movements." Both al-Aajurri and ibn Battah used the phrase "cannot suffice" when reporting the consensus, so refer to their statements if you truly submit to the Salaf.
Among those who mentioned similar phrasing without referring to the consensus is imam az-Zuhri, as narrated by at-Talmnaki and mentioned by ibn Taymiyyah in "al-Eemaan," and imam ibn Abi Zamaneen in "Usool as-Sunnah," both stating that speech and action are interconnected, one cannot be complete without the other. Imam al-Awza'i, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "Faith does not stand except with speech, and faith and speech do not stand except with action." Imam Sufyan ath-Thawri said similarly, reporting this from the jurists as narrated by ibn Battah. Abu Thawr said in his debate with the Murji'ah: "He is not a believer except with what they agreed upon from these three things," as narrated by al-Laalikaa'i, number 1590. This is understood from the statement of Wakee': "The Murji'ah who say that acknowledgment suffices without action, and whoever says this is doomed." It is clear that al-Muzani and Abu Thawr were students of ash-Shaafi'ee, and Wakee' was one of his teachers. Imam al-Aajurri, the shaykh of the Haramayn, followed the Shaafi'ee madhhab. This all supports the transmission of al-Laalikaa'i and ibn Taymiyyah's statement from ash-Shaafi'ee (may Allah have mercy on him). How can you then deny that there are imams of the Salaf who say that one of the three does not suffice without the other, and that faith is not accepted unless all three are completed?
Any attempt to distort one of their statements regarding the rank of actions from words and divert it from the meaning that words do not suffice without actions will result in the same distortion regarding the rank of words from belief and the rank of words from actions. This distortion implies that one attributes to the Salaf the statement that words suffice without belief, which is the definition of major hypocrisy, and that actions suffice without words, which no sane person would say.
Al-Madkhali objected to this transmission, namely the statement "one of the three does not suffice without the other," by referring to the many who quoted ash-Sahafi'ee's well-known phrase that faith is words and actions that increase and decrease. I do not see how this contradicts as it explains and clarifies its meaning, just as ibn 'Uyaynah, ibn Raahuwayh, and Abu Thawr (may Allah have mercy on them) mentioned. Al-Madkhali, like others, failed to connect this issue to the ruling on abandoning prayer specifically and failed to link it to the ruling on abandoning the four practical pillars of Islam.
If he had considered the statements of ibn Raahuwayh, al-Aajurri, ibn Battah, and ibn Taymiyyah and the examples some of them gave, he would have understood that they meant all obligatory acts, including the four pillars and other obligations. This is confirmed by the fact that some of those whose statements we previously quoted did not declare the one who abandons salah as a kaafir, such as az-Zuhri, ash-Shaafi'ee, Abu Thawr, and ibn Battah. They were even less likely to declare someone an unbeliever for abandoning any of the other practical pillars of Islam. However, they declared the one who abandons all physical actions of worship entirely as a kaafir. This shows that the flaw in this objection is a misunderstanding.
Al-Madkhali also objected to the notion that the Companions did not encounter the Murji'ah and that it was the Taabi'oon who did. The response is: Truly, you do not understand what you are saying. This would mean that no one could claim the consensus of the Companions that the apparent meanings of the texts on attributes are accepted and that the Qur'an is the uncreated word of Allah, because the Jahmiyyah's negation and claim that the Qur'an was created appeared after the Companions. This contradicts the actions of the imams, as these great principles were inherited by the Salaf generation after generation, both in words and meaning.
When the innovators raised their heads, they coined these inherited meanings with expressions that clarified the truth and refuted falsehood. It is not as al-Madkhali assumed that such sayings cannot be attributed to the Companions because they did not transmit them verbatim. Hence, he does not see that faith is defined as words and actions, even though he acknowledges that the Companions saw actions as part of faith. He considers shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah mistaken in attributing this definition to them and denies that any Salaf said: "one of the three does not suffice without the other" and that faith is not accepted unless all three are completed. He questions how they could say this while transmitting the hadiths of intercession and the virtue of "There is no god [worthy of worship] but Allah," asking if anyone who fears Allah and respects His Messenger would dare contradict these firmly established sayings.
Indeed, you do not understand what you are saying. According to your statement, shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah and imam al-Laalikaa'i, in affirming ash-Shaafi'ee's saying that you denied and using it as evidence, would have dared to contradict the hadith of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him)!! Al-Madkhali also described those who consider abandoning all actions as disbelief as not valuing the hadiths of intercession and the virtue of "There is no god [worthy of worship] but Allah," which implies criticism of imam Sufyan ibn 'Uyaynah (may Allah have mercy on him) for his statement that abandoning the obligatory acts is disbelief. Al-Madkhali has read his statement, as he quoted it in his article. This also implies criticism of every Imam who declared the one who abandons one of the pillars of Islam as a disbeliever, even though al-Madkhali does not realize what he is saying.
Al-Madkhali considered the statement that faith decreases until only a small amount remains as valid and chose this statement without detail, using the hadith of intercession as evidence. He described people who benefit from intercession as having the smallest amount of faith. This does not mean that the decrease stops at this point and that it cannot continue until it disappears entirely, as some people may continue to lose faith until they abandon all actions completely. This is why al-'Awzaa'i, ibn 'Uyaynah, ibn Raahuwayh, and al-Barbahari affirmed that faith decreases until nothing remains. These imams (may Allah have mercy on them) understood the hadith of intercession better than you, and you have not mentioned any early scholars who opposed them. Where is the adherence to the understanding of the Salaf in this significant issue?! This issue has already been detailed in the second point.
We should point out here that al-Madkhali did not explicitly state in his article "An Arrogant Pseudo-Scholar..." that he retracted his statement that completely abandoning the physical actions of worship is disbelief. Therefore, it is not surprising if he distorts the words of those scholars who said this and interprets them as only considering the abandonment of the physical pillars of Islam as disbelief, excluding other obligations. This has already been addressed. It is also not surprising that he claims, despite everything he said at the end of his writings, that he has not retracted and still believes that completely abandoning the physical actions of worship is disbelief. If he makes this claim, it means he does not see abandoning the physical actions of worship as disbelief in itself, but rather as disbelief if it is accompanied by internal disbelief, such as denial or arrogance. This is a plausible interpretation, indicated by his statement in his book "Unveiling the Lies, Distortions, and Betrayals of Fawzi al-Bahrayni":
"The one who does not act according to faith falls into one of two categories: either disbelief if he denies the necessity of actions or completely abandons them, and this can only arise from denial, arrogance, and obstinacy. This is a disbeliever, outside the fold of Islam."
The conjunction here implies causation, which strongly indicates that abandoning actions entirely does not constitute disbelief merely by the act itself, but because it signifies internal disbelief. Hence, what constitutes disbelief is the internal state of denial or arrogance, not the abandonment itself. This is similar to the stance of the Murji'ah regarding disbelief, which stems from their view on faith. Since they excluded actions from faith, they did not consider actions that would be disbelief in themselves, but only as indications of internal disbelief. However, al-Madkhali diverges from the Murji'ah by considering arrogance, a matter of the heart, as inherently disbelieving, which Murji'ah factions do not consider as inherently disbelieving, as noted by ibnul-Qayyim in his book "Prayer and the Ruling on Its Abandonment."
On this interpretation, Saalim ibn Muhammad al-Arjani, in his book "The Hidden Sayings of Contemporary Murji'ah," agrees. However, this interpretation contradicts al-Madkhali’s statement in the second part of his article "An Arrogant Pseudo-Scholar..." which is the latest thing he wrote on this subject:
"I say that contemporary Ahlus-Sunnah, like their predecessors, do not limit disbelief to denial and rejection without considering words and actions. This is a slander against them. I and Ahlus-Sunnah are the first to reject such a claim against its proponents. We believe that disbelief can be in the heart, such as denial, and through words, like insulting Allah or His Messenger or other prophets, or insulting the religion, or denying a verse from the Quran, and so on, which makes the speaker a disbeliever. And it can also be through physical actions, like prostrating to an idol or desecrating the Qur'an by stepping on it, or intentionally praying not facing the Qiblah."
Accordingly, it is not intended by his statement "and this only arises from denial or arrogance and obstinacy" to restrict the ruling of disbelief to denial or arrogance, but rather he mentioned it to illustrate the correlation between the internal and external. This is a well-known statement from previous scholars. Otherwise, al-Madkhali would have contradicted himself. If someone says why not ask the shaykh to clarify his intention behind these ambiguous statements, the answer is: I did, but I received no response. In any case, by proving that disbelief can be caused by a disbelieving act and denying the view that disbelief is confined to denial and rejection, al-Madkhali contradicts himself by including the view that abandoning the physical actions of worship entirely is not disbelief among the opinions of Ahlus-Sunnah.
The issues of disbelief and faith are interconnected, as they are opposing counterparts. If you consider ibnul-Qayyim's introduction, which he mentioned in detailing the issues of faith and disbelief to clarify the predominant view on the ruling of the one who abandons prayer in his book "Prayer and the Ruling on Its Abandonment," pages 49-59, it would become clear. Whoever considers actions as integral to faith must also consider disbelieving actions as inherently disbelieving. This is the stance of Ahlus-Sunnah. However, those who consider actions not part of faith do not view disbelieving actions as inherently disbelieving. They may either consider it as evidence of internal disbelief or require that the person deems such actions permissible to declare him a disbeliever. This is the stance of the Murji'ah. Disbelieving actions are considered contradictory to faith by Ahlus-Sunnah because they invalidate a fundamental aspect of faith, which is the physical actions of worship.
Therefore, completely abandoning physical actions of worship is also contradictory to faith and inherently disbelieving. Only this stance aligns with the foundations of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah. Conversely, the view that completely abandoning physical actions of worship is not disbelief aligns only with the foundations of the Murji'ah, who excluded physical actions from faith. Those who hold this view while asserting that faith is words and actions have combined contradictory elements and distorted the statement of Ahlus-Sunnah by interpreting it in a way that aligns with the foundations of the Murji'ah.
This makes it clear that Rabee' al-Madkhali is far from precise in discussing these matters and accurately reporting them. And Allah is the source of help. Here ends the response to al-Madkhali concerning the issue of faith. From what has been said, it is evident that al-Madkhali's method in dealing with the words of scholars is flawed, and this is not surprising since he does not see the importance of applying principles of linguistic implications from Usool al-Fiqh to understand the words of scholars. The result is what you have seen.
I conclude this issue by highlighting five principles of the contemporary Murji'ah that indicate the invalidity of their claims, which many of them have adhered to. May Allah guide them all:
First point: They interpret the statement of the Salaf that faith is "words and deeds" as a definition of the obligatory completeness of faith, not of the essence of faith that nullifies with its absence. They consider this definition not for the general meaning of faith, and that the minimal level of acceptable faith is the belief in the heart, the declaration by the tongue, and the deeds of the heart, excluding the deeds of the limbs. This is refuted by the consensus mentioned by ash-Shaafi'ee, al-Aajurri, and ibn Battah, among others, which defines faith as inclusive of belief in the heart, declaration by the tongue, and deeds by the limbs. Ibnul-Qayyim said in "Shifaa' al-'Aleel": "Like in another statement 'the smallest, smallest, smallest amount of faith,' which means believing His messengers and submitting to them with heart and limbs."
Second point: They deny the correlation between the internal and external aspects of faith when faith is weak, contrary to what imam al-Maawardi said in "Ta'dheem Qadr as-Salah" (vol. 2, p. 776): "Faith necessitates reverence for Allah, glorifying Him, and hastening to obey Him to the extent that the heart's knowledge and recognition of Him dictates." Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah reiterated this in several places in his "Majmoo' al-Fatawa" (vol. 7, pp. 50, 221, 294, 556, and vol. 10, p. 7), where he stated: "The Murji'ah do not dispute that the faith in the heart calls for obedience and necessitates it. Obedience is its fruit and result, but they dispute whether obedience is a necessary consequence." Ibnul-Qayyim said in "al-Fawaa'id": "The absence of outward action despite the absence of hindrances is evidence of internal corruption and lack of faith, and its deficiency is evidence of its weakness, and its strength is evidence of its strength." Thus, the Ahlus-Sunnah view a necessary correlation between external and internal actions in both the strength and weakness of faith, whereas the Murji'ah do not see this correlation in either state. Contemporary Murji'ah have placed themselves among Ahl al-Sunnah by acknowledging the correlation in the state of strong faith while aligning with the Murji'ah by denying it in the state of weak faith. How can it not be said that they have agreed with the Murji'ah?
Third point: They claim there is a minimum level of faith that does not decrease beyond it, even if the deeds of the limbs are entirely abandoned. This contradicts what the imams al-'Awzaa'i, ibn 'Uyaynah, Ishaaq ibn Raahuwayh, and al-Barbahari in "Sharh as-Sunnah" said, that faith decreases until nothing remains of it. This issue has been detailed previously.
Fourth point: They interpret compliance, which is a condition of "Laa ilaaha ill'Allah", as the compliance of the heart not necessitating the deeds of the limbs. This contradicts the explanations of imam 'Abdur-Rahman ibn Hasan and shaykh Haafidh Hakami, who interpreted compliance as including the deeds of the limbs. Imam 'Abdul-Lateef ibn 'Abdur-Rahman reported consensus on this in "Misbaah adh-Dhalaam," where he said: "He began the definition of Islam with the two testimonies, and it is clear that knowledge, speech, and deeds are conditions for their validity, and this is not hidden from anyone who has the scent of knowledge." They interpreted their statement to mean that compliance of the heart necessarily entails compliance of the limbs in general, not that the compliance of the limbs is a condition for the validity of the two testimonies when pronounced. This is not stated by any of Ahlus-Sunnah, except that the compliance of the limbs must follow and is a condition for remaining in Islam. Whoever abandons the deeds of the limbs entirely leaves Islam.
Fifth point: Denying that turning away from the religion of Allah, not learning it, and not acting upon it is one of the nullifiers of Islam, or distorting its meaning by restricting it to the turning away of the heart without involving the limbs. This contradicts the apparent words of shaykhul-Islam Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab (may Allah have mercy on him) in his Ten Nullifiers of Islam. The intended meaning here is complete turning away, not partial, as is evident.
For those seeking further clarification on the previously discussed matters of faith and to examine the opinions of the scholars, they should refer to the books "Eemaan according to the Salaf and Its Relation to Actions" and "Refutation of Contemporary Misconceptions" by Muhammad ibn Mahmood al-Khudayr, and "The Innocence of the People of Hadith and Sunnah from the Actions of the Murji'ah" by Muhammad al-Kathiri. Both books complement each other and one does not suffice without the other.
My advice to anyone who has received the previous issues from Rabee' al-Madkhali is to review his knowledge, for this knowledge is religion, so consider from whom you take your religion, as stated by imam ibn Seereen (may Allah have mercy on him). Reflect on the words of al-Muzani (may Allah have mercy on him): "Whoever makes a mistake in a name is not like someone who makes a mistake in meaning. A mistake in meaning is more severe," as narrated by al-Laalikaa'i in "Sharh Usool I'tiqaad Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah" (vol. 3, p. 958).
The Fourth Principle: His statement that it is obligatory to boycott the innovator unconditionally, without considering the benefits or harms of doing so, and that the consideration of benefits and harms is merely an opinion of ibn Taymiyyah, which contradicts the practice of the Salaf.
You can find his statements on this issue in the book "Safeguarding the Salafi from the Whispers and Deceptions of 'Ali al-Halabi" by al-Bazmool, pages 226-230. This indicates one of two things: either he is following his whims, or he is deliberately ignoring the examination of the twenty-eighth volume of "Fatwas on Jihaad" due to its subject matter. In it, ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) mentions in two places, pages 206 and 210-213, that Ahmad and other Salaf (may Allah have mercy on them) did not instruct those who asked them about Khurasaan and Basrah to boycott the innovators as a form of discipline because the Jahmiyyah dominated the former and the Qadariyyah the latter.
He cited what is in "Issues of Ishaaq ibn Mansoor," narrated by al-Khallaal in "Sunnah," quoting imam Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on him) when asked about someone who says the Qur'an is created: should they show enmity towards them or be lenient? His response was, "The people of Khurasaan cannot withstand them." This is also mentioned in "Issues of Ahmad and ibn Raahuwayh" by al-Karmaani, and his statement on the Qadariyyah: "If we were to abandon narrating from the Qadariyyah, we would abandon narrating from most of the people of Basrah." This matter falls under the principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil. How can one not consider the benefits and harms in this matter?
Not applying the consideration of benefits and harms in enjoining good and forbidding evil, including the issue of boycotting the innovator, without establishing a valid distinction, makes his statement similar to the discretionary judgment of the opinion-based scholars, which was criticized by the scholars of hadith jurisprudence among the Salaf imams like ash-Shaafi'ee, Ahmad, and al-Bukhaari. Ibn Taymiyyah elaborated on this in his book "A Principle in Discretionary Judgment." Isn't this akin to distinguishing between similar matters without evidence?
Had he realized that boycotting has two types, as ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) explained: boycotting as discipline to deter from innovation, and boycotting for piety to avoid the evil of innovation and to protect oneself, he wouldn't have needed to make such a claim. He wouldn't have needed to object to ibn Taymiyyah's view on the grounds that young people don't have enough knowledge to weigh benefits and harms, exposing them to the traps of the innovators, as if ibn Taymiyyah's words condemned them to loss and destruction.
This assertion proves that al-Madkhali did not understand ibn Taymiyyah's statement correctly. Truly, the saying is accurate: how many critics of a correct statement fail due to their poor understanding? Considering benefits and harms is more closely related to disciplinary boycotting—since it is a type of jihaad—than to boycotting for piety and avoidance, which is to stay away from the assemblies of evil.
The purpose of disciplinary boycotting is to limit the spread of innovation and deter it so that it doesn't spread among people. This can't be achieved when the innovators dominate because the innovation is already widespread, and the condition of capability is unmet. Therefore, considering the benefits and harms in this type of boycotting is evident.
However, boycotting for piety and avoidance is to protect oneself from the evil company of innovators, so one does not listen to their innovations—unless it is a qualified scholar aiming to refute their falsehood and clarify the truth to them, hoping for their return or the return of some of them to the truth, adhering to the conditions set by the Salaf in debating with the innovators, as their principle was to avoid debates generally.
One should not take an innovator as a close friend because the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "A person is on the religion of his close friend." Whether the dominance is for Ahlus-Sunnah or the people of innovation, the principle of this type of boycotting remains constant, with the only exception being previously stated.
This exception is based on considering the benefits and harms with its legitimate guidelines, which is specific to scholars, and the common people have no part in it. This type of boycotting doesn't prevent dealing with an innovator to ward off his harm in cases where the innovators dominate and the Sunni is weak, as Ahmad hinted and ibn Taymiyyah explicitly stated.
For more details on this and to see the statements of the scholars, refer to the writings of shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah in "Majmoo’ al-Fataawa," volume 28, pages 203-213, the book "Boycotting the Innovator" by shaykh Bakr Abu Zayd (may Allah have mercy on him), "The Position of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa’ah towards Ahlul-Ahwaa’ wal-Bida’" by Ibraaheem ar-Ruhayli, volume 2, pages 553-563, and "The Reality of Innovation and Its Rulings" by Sa'eed ibn Naasir al-Ghaamidi, volume 2, pages 338-346.
Al-Madkhali's principle confirms what was previously mentioned about his falling into what ibn Taymiyyah warned against, namely, taking the general statements of the Salaf regarding boycotting the innovator without referring to what explains their words, leading him into this detestable methodology under the pretext that the principles of deduction are only applied to understanding the words of Allah and His Messenger, not the words of the scholars.
Therefore, considering the issue of boycotting innovators as one of the fundamentals of the belief of Ahlus-Sunnah, as indicated by their writings in creed, does not mean the matter is unrestricted without detail or limitation. This further confirms al-Madkhali's lack of knowledge in the principles of jurisprudence and its impact on his principles.
One should note, in this and other matters, the saying of shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) in Majmoo’ al-Fataawa, Volume 28, page 213: "Many of the responses given by imam Ahmad and other imams were based on the specific situation of the questioner, whose condition was known to the one being asked. Or they were addressed to a particular individual whose condition was known, making them similar to the specific cases narrated from the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) whose rulings apply only to similar situations."
Based on this principle, it is often found that individuals or small groups of al-Madkhali’s followers have boycotted the majority of people with an illegitimate boycott, believing them to be innovators. Allah's help is sought.. Regarding such individuals, shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah said in Majmoo’ al-Fataawa, Volume 28, page 213: "Some people have made this general, applying forms of boycotting and denunciation that they were not commanded to do. It is neither obligatory nor recommended, and they may have neglected obligations or recommendations or committed prohibitions because of it."
He then mentioned those who do the opposite: "Others completely disregard this, failing to boycott what they were commanded to boycott of sinful innovations. Instead, they abandon it out of neglect, not out of deliberate abstention, or they may fall into it. They might abandon it out of dislike and yet not forbid it to others, nor punish those deserving of punishment for it. As a result, they neglect the duty of forbidding evil, which they were commanded to do either as an obligation or as a recommendation. They thus commit what they were forbidden to do and neglect what they were commanded to do. This is this, and Allah’s religion stands in the middle between the excessive and the negligent."
Moreover, you do not find al-Madkhali and his followers giving any importance, either in their words or actions, to shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah's saying in Majmoo’ al-Fataawa, Volume 28, page 212: "If it becomes impossible to establish the obligatory duties such as knowledge and jihaad and other than these except by using a person involved in innovation whose harm is less than the harm of neglecting that obligatory duty, then achieving the interest of that obligatory duty with the minor harm accompanying it is better than neglecting it." Allah's help is sought.
Conclusion:
These are al-Madkhali’s four principles that have spread among his followers and have distinguished them from other groups. The unifying theme among these principles is extremism in the area of declaring people as innovators and boycotting them. This is contrary to the approach of the Salaf. Just as it is necessary to avoid negligence in this area, it is equally important to avoid excess. His extremism in declaring people innovators is akin to the extremism of the Khawaarij in the area of declaring people as disbelievers. Through these principles, he has caused a significant rift in the Salafi movement. May Allah help us.
Al-Madkhali has settled on the stance of the Murji’ah of the present era regarding the concept of faith. He now follows a path similar to that of 'Ali al-Halabi in his deceptions, despite the issuance of fatwas from the Permanent Committee for Islamic Research against him. There is no known individual who claims to follow Salafiyyah and has as much notoriety in the Islamic arena for repeatedly contradicting shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah on methodological issues as this man does. Sometimes, he justifies it by claiming that ibn Taymiyyah made an ijtihaad (independent reasoning) and deviated from what the Salaf adhered to, sometimes by misinterpreting his words, and sometimes by suggesting that if ibn Taymiyyah had known the implications of his words, he would not have said them, or by claiming that his books were tampered with. He has critiqued him with weak arguments on the matter of faith, which is a fundamental principle of belief. At times, he disputes the consensus of the Companions that ibn Taymiyyah reported, and at other times, what he narrated from ash-Shaafi’ee regarding consensus. This is truly astonishing. If it weren't for the fact that he is ibn Taymiyyah, he might have been subject to some criticism from the "imam of al-Jarh wat-Ta'deel" (and this is not a typographical error).
This clearly shows that al-Madkhali is not from the people of knowledge and justice in the field of al-Jarh wa al-Ta’deel (criticism and commendation of hadith narrators), let alone being an imam in it. Whoever assigns this role to him has given it to someone unfit for it. I remind the followers of shaykh Rabee’ with the words of imam ibn Rajab (may Allah have mercy on him) in "Jaami’ al-'Uloom wal-Hikam" while explaining the thirty-fifth hadith: "When people’s differences in religious matters increased, and their divisions multiplied, this led to an increase in enmity and mutual curses among them. Each of them shows that they hate for the sake of Allah. In reality, the person may be excused, or he may not be excused but is following his desires, failing to seek knowledge of what should be hated. Much of the enmity occurs due to differences in opinion, with each person thinking that their opinion is the truth and not considering the possibility of error. This suspicion is certainly wrong. If one thinks their opinion is correct, it may be right or wrong. The love for their view might be driven by mere desire or habit, which undermines the claim that this enmity is for Allah’s sake. Therefore, a believer must be cautious and ensure that he does not engage in prohibited enmity." I also remind them of shaykhul-Islam ibn Taymiyyah’s words — if his words on methodological issues still hold that high regard among them that al-Madkhali tries to rival, without building anything himself: "You will find many people loving some and hating others for whims and opinions they don’t know the meanings of or their evidence. They ally with some and oppose others based on these opinions, without authentic transmission from the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, and the Salaf, without understanding their meanings or knowing their implications. This results from making statements without proper evidence, establishing them as doctrines to which people are invited, forming alliances and enmities based on them."
For this reason, dissension quickly arises among them. Those who followed his method or something similar, and those close to his views, have had disputes leading to division and conflict, such as al-Maghrawi, Mahmood al-Haddaad, Usaamah al-Qoosi, 'Ali al-Halabi, and Faalih al-Harbi, among others. Allah, the Exalted, says [interpretation of the meaning], "If it had been from [any] other than Allah, they would have found within it much contradiction" (Quran 4:82), and He also says [interpretation of the meaning], "But they forgot a portion of what they were reminded of, so We caused among them enmity and hatred" (Quran 5:14). Allah is the best to grant success and guidance to what He loves and is pleased with.
Praise be to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon the Messenger of Allah.
Written by:
Walad al-Haaj Muhammad al-Ifreeqi
Completed on the 20th of Safar, 1435 AH. (23rd of December, 2013)
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